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I. INTRODUCTION
At one time, Harvard University offered an interdisciplinary seminar,
Thinking About Thinking, taught by three leading names in philosophy, law
and science: Robert Nozick, Alan Dershowitz and the late Stephen Jay
Gould.' This seminar presumably allowed participants to observe and un-
derstand how leading figures in different disciplines approached common
problems, and to consider and appreciate the merits, as well as the deficien-
cies, of their different methods of analysis and problem solving.2 Achieving
this goal was apparently not without cost. As noted by Stephen Jay Gould:
"Philosophers will dissect the logic of an argument, an exercise devoid of
empirical content, well past the point of glaze over scientific eyes.... [In
contrast,] the law gives decisive weight to the history of its own develop-
ment.... 3
Although this statement may be overblown, it may gain some force if
applied to efforts to combine philosophy and law. Claims of intellectual vo-
yeurism and the use of cartoons to illustrate jurisprudential arguments are
not uncommon. Yet not all efforts at integrating law and philosophy are
nonsense. As with most syncretic efforts, the initial problem is how to con-
duct the discussion. One method might be to start with philosophy, and at-
tempt to adapt its theoretical structures to law. If successful, this move
could accomplish two goals. It could help to explain and rationalize law by
viewing it from a different perspective, and it could also broaden the audi-
ence with whom to discuss the new explanations.
Such a move would be useful, however, only if the resulting clash or in-
terplay of views and practices could cause the participants to willingly alter
an existing point of view or their perspective on it. Put another way, unless
debate is to be had for debate's sake, insights from the philosophy of law are
valuable only to the extent that they are able to modify or change legal
1. See Harvard University, Edmond J. Safra Found. Ctr. for Ethics, available at http:l/www.
ethics.harvard.edu/academics.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
2. See id.
3. Stephen Jay Gould, Impeaching a Self-Appointed Judge, Scl. AM., July 1992, at 118 (review-
ing PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, DARWIN ON TRIAL (1991)).
4. See, e.g., Alan R. Madry, Analytic Deconstructionism? The Intellectual Voyeurism of An-
thony D'Amato, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1033 (1995); Louis E. Wolcher, What We Do Not Doubt: A
Critical Legal Perspective, 46. HASTINGS L.J. 1783 (1995) (using, among other things, a Garfield
cartoon to illustrate semantic points). As to interdisciplinary scholarship generally, see Richard A.
Posner, Medieval Iceland and Modem Legal Scholarship, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1495, 1510-11 (1992)
(reviewing WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW AND SOCIETY IN
SAGA ICELAND (1990), and listing possible reasons for the expansion of interdisciplinary approaches
to legal scholarship). Cf P. John Kozyris, In the Cauldron of Jurisprudence: The View From Within
the Stew, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 421, 440 (1991) (characterizing current jurisprudential discourse as
having been "derailed into some sort of fantasyland where the main obsession appears to be drilling
holes in water.").
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minds. Debates on the nature of judging, for example, might bear not only
on how we select judges, but also on how they perform once selected.5
But, as Gould hinted at in the passage in the opening paragraph, some-
times the practices or methods of one discipline do not transport well into
another.6 One problem may be the jargon, argot or the particular practices of
one side. Notations in modal logic, for example, can cause lawyers fits.
Another problem lies with the level of generality at which the two disci-
plines operate. In physics, for example, quantum mechanics has to date
proved superior to Newtonian or Aristotelian mechanics in predicting
events, yet no pool player calculates Schriidinger's equations when setting
up her next shot. 7 Yet another problem, to paraphrase Grant Gilmore,' may
be the quality of the lawyer's work in the non-legal discipline; it may be no
more than multidisciplinary cross-dressing.9
Traditional scholarly debate and exchange can go a long way to mini-
mize these problems. Terminological differences can be identified and
worked out, and related disciplines can agree on transitional rules to mediate
degrees of generality. Inquiry and debate can help resolve quality issues.'o
There may be, however, an intractable problem in trying to combine the
study of lawyers' language with the study of language by philosophers."' If
5. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH (1992); Ruth Gavison, The Implica-
tions of Jurisprudential Theories for Judicial Election, Selection and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1617 (1988). But cf Neomi Rao, Comment, A Backdoor to Policy Making: The Use of Phi-
losophers by the Supreme Court, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1998) (surveying failed attempts by six
noted philosophers to influence the United States Supreme Court through submissions of amicus
briefs).
6. See supra text accompanying note 3.
7. Cf. ERNST MAYR, TOWARD A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY: OBSERVATIONS OF AN
EVOLUTIONIST 11 (1988) ("For instance, it would be futile to try to explain the flow of air over the
wing of an airplane in terms of elementary particles.").
8. This comment apparently was never written down. See Roger C. Cramton, Demystifying
Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO. L.J. 1, 15 n.47 (1986).
9. The term "multidisciplinary cross-dressing" is from Anthony Gottlieb, Why Do You Do the
Things You Do?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1993, at 11 (reviewing ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF
RATIONALITY (1993)).
10. There is also the problem of fame by association. To get published, aspiring writers may
invoke the names of currently fashionable philosophers in hopes of attaining fame by association.
See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 525 n.56 (1988) (criticizing the use of phrases
like "post-Wittgensteinian" as "attempting to lean on the argumentative props of associations with
philosophers whose names are currently fashionable in legal circles"). For an article poking fun at
this practice, see Sidney W. DeLong, Jacques of All Trades: Derrida, Lacan and the Commercial
Lawyer, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 131 (1995).
11. Professor Charles Collier has written on this topic, as well as the value of inter-disciplinary
studies in general. See Charles W. Collier, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship in Search of a Para-
digm, 42 DUKE L.J. 840 (1993); Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in
Law: Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE L.J. 191
(1991). With respect to similar questions raised about the use of Wittgenstein's scholarship, see Mi-
chael Steven Green, Dworkin's Fallacy, or What the Philosophy of Language Can't Teach Us About
the Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1897 (2003); Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Note, Breaking the Rules?: Wittgen-
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law is a discrete discipline, 12 with its own autonomous rules and practices on
how to interpret language, philosophical theories may not have much to say
about any normative aspect of those legal rules and practices. In this sense,
law's autonomy acts as a preliminary defense to the relevancy of the phi-
losophical inquiry. It is akin to saying that the rules of one club do not apply
in another.
But even if one accepts the proposition that language is philosophy's
primary province, it does not automatically follow that insights from phi-
losophy about language can inform the practice of law. Much academic
writing in the philosophy of language is about what meaning is, not about
what particular words mean in specific contexts. Yet law deals daily with
the meaning of particular words in concrete circumstances. Rather than pro-
viding endless interesting philosophical studies, it may be the case that most
legal inquiry does not present any interesting or particularly difficult phi-
losophical issues.13
The problems inherent in importing the practices and mores of certain
types of philosophical inquiry into law may stem from the different context
in which philosophical theories are spawned and take root. As Gould notes,
the method employed by philosophers differs from that employed by either
law or science. 14 As a result, the transfer from one discipline to another of a
theory, for example a theory of meaning, may be disastrous or it may be ba-
nal. It could be similar to planting a hothouse flower in a refrigerator or dis-
covering you planted cattails when bulrushes were intended.
In this article I want to illustrate some problems with the transference of
theory between disciplines. My examples derive from legal literature and
stein and Legal Realism, 107 YALE L.J. 1853 (1998); George A. Martinez, The New Wittgensteini-
ans and the End of Jurisprudence, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545, 570-71 (1996); Stephen M. Feldman,
The Politics of Post Modem Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 166 (1996); Christopher L. Kutz, Just
Disagreement: Indeterminacy and Rationality in the Rule of Law, 103 YALE L.J. 997, 1007-14
(1994).
For scholarship which employs or at least invokes Wittgenstein in aid of its analysis, see
WITTGENSTEIN AND LEGAL THEORY (Dennis M. Patterson ed., 1992) (containing eleven essays re-
garding Wittgenstein's and legal theory); Brian Langille, Revolution Without Foundation: The
Grammar of Scepticism and Law, 33 MCGILL L.J. 451 (1988); Charles M. Yablon, Law and Meta-
physics, 96 Yale L.J. 613 (1987) (reviewing SAUL A. KRIPKE, WrIrGENSTEIN ON RULES AND
PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982)).
12. Passions can run deep on this topic. See Richard Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autono-
mous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987); Owen Fiss, The Death of Law?, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1986); Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60
TEX. L. REV. 35 (1981).
13. This is not to say that law (or any other discipline) cannot be informed by philosophy; quite
the contrary. At a basic level, law and philosophy have always enjoyed a natural partnership. But
not all of philosophy can inform law. In particular, grand philosophical theories may not have much
to say in particular cases. Imagine calling a linguistic philosopher as an expert witness in a contract
interpretation case, and you see my point. Cf. Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the
Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1811 (1990) (suggesting that pragmatic philosophy may not
have much to say about specific applications of the law once one acknowledges philosophy's mes-
sage about theoretical debate).
14. See Gould, supra note 3. Gould lamented this fact, and his last book was an attempt to
bridge the gap, or at least outline the stumbling blocks, between the sciences and the humanities.
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE HEDGEHOG, THE Fox, AND THE MAGISTER'S POX (2003).
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reported legal opinions which rely upon or incorporate the philosophy of
Ludwig Wittgenstein as an aid to understanding some facet of law.
In order to set up the discussion, I first sketch some salient points of
Wittgenstein's philosophy that have attracted attention by scholars and
courts.15 With this interpretation in place, I then show how different, and
equally or more plausible, interpretations can lead to different results in par-
ticular cases. I do this by surveying some attempts, by academics and
judges, to incorporate Wittgenstein into legal scholarship and into individual
cases. In most cases, I find the use of Wittgenstein to be either irrelevant to
the matter discussed, or superfluous-bordering on the gratuitous or the
theanthropic. The obvious suggestion is that such citations or discussions
are not very useful in the sense adumbrated above: they don't have the
power or the capacity to change or inform views.
My goal is not to rid legal scholarship of philosophical insights. That
would be as wrongheaded as it would be wrong. Rather, by the descriptions
offered, I hope to illustrate the contingent nature of legal scholarship based
solely upon philosophy, and to suggest that the impact of extending these
contingencies in particular cases, or classes of cases, is not beneficial to aca-
demic debate, nor is it necessary to decide particular cases.
H1. A SHORT SKETCH OF WiTIGENSTEIN'S LATER PHILOSOPHY16
Ludwig Wittgenstein is a major figure in twentieth century philosophy. 17
His early work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,18 formed one of the ral-
lying points for logical positivists such as Rudolf Carnap and other members
15. In this effort, I seek to sketch a plausible understanding of some of Wittgenstein's points. I
am not making a positive claim that it constitutes a definitive interpretation.
16. I acknowledge that this section replicates the very practice I decry: a lawyer doing philoso-
phy. For my purposes, however, I believe that all I need accomplish is a plausible reading of Witt-
genstein's philosophy. I am prepared to accept that others will disagree with this synopsis; but that
disagreement will, in part, aid my thesis. For if there can be legitimate disagreement over how to
read a particular philosopher, there certainly can be legitimate disagreement in any action proposed
on the basis of a disputed reading of the works of that philosopher.
17. This short biographical sketch is taken from GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, WITrGENSTEIN
13-62 (1982). See also RAY MONK, LUDWIG WrITGENSTEIN: THE DUTY OF GENIUS (1990). An
interesting take on Wittgenstein involving a famous (or infamous) incident with Sir Karl Popper can
be found in DAVID EDMONDS & JOHN EIDINOW, WTTGENSTEIN'S POKER: THE STORY OF A TEN-
MINUTE ARGUMENT BETWEEN TWO GREAT PHILOSOPHERS (2001).
There may not be consensus on Wittgenstein's ultimate status or stature. See, e.g., A.C.
GRAYLING, WITGENSTEIN 112 (1988) (noting that "Wittgenstein's later philosophy is not as it
stands persuasive" and that "[a]nyone reading [other accounts of Wittgenstein's philosophy] would
naturally surmise that Wittgenstein is the most influential presense in twentieth-century philosophy.
In fact he is not.").
18. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (David F. Pears & Brian F.
McGuiness trans., 1974) [hereinafter TLP].
of the Vienna Circle. His later work, the Philosophical Investigations,1 9 re-
examines some of the premises of his early work, and in some ways is al-
most directly contrary in effect. It too has spawned movements and inter-
preters.
But Wittgenstein himself was a puzzle. Of his major philosophical
works, only the Tractatus was published during his lifetime. After writing
the Tractatus, he was convinced he could add nothing more to philosophy,
and he thus removed himself from philosophy for over ten years, taking on
jobs as a grammar school schoolmaster, a gardener's assistant, an architect,
and an author of a children's primer.20 He continued to think about philoso-
phy, however, and problems he saw in the Tractatus analysis caused him to
return to Cambridge in 1929 to become a fellow of Trinity College. When
he died in 1952, he left a huge amount of unpublished work, much of which
has now been published in one way or another.2 '
These later, posthumously published, works are also a puzzle. 22 Con-
structed in tightly written prose, they have an aphoristic character which can
invoke both mysticism and illumination. They also contain interesting and
valuable insights on classical philosophical problems, such as the essence of
meaning, the nature of philosophy and many others.23 Whether they consist
of an integrated and consistent body of writing can be and is hotly debated.24
Whether they contain "the answer" as to the questions addressed is even
more controversial. Notwithstanding this controversy, I hope to sketch two
19. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed.
1974) (1961) [hereinafter PI].
20. See generally VON WRIGHT, supra note 17; MONK, supra note 17, at 169-91.
21. The definitive catalogue of Wittgenstein's Nachlass (legacy) first appeared in Georg
Hendrick von Wright, Special Supplement: the Wittgenstein Papers, 78 PHIL. REV. 483 (1969). It
was updated in VON WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 35-62. See also David G. Stem, Review Essay: Re-
cent Work on Wittgenstein, 1980-1990, 98 SYNTHESE 415, 435-36 (1994) (estimating that Wittgen-
stein left "[aipproximately eight manuscript volumes, notebooks and papers, or over 12,000 manu-
script pages" covering the years 1929-1951). Oxford University Press offers the complete Nachlass
on CD-Rom for £635. See Oxford University Press, available at http://www.oup.co.uk/
academic/humanities/philosophy/wittgenstein/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
22. Since Wittgenstein did not publish any of the Nachlass during his life, there are lingering
questions of whether his writings are sufficiently finished to study, and if so, which of (or whether)
his notebooks represent his considered or final thought. See S. STEPHEN HILMY, THE LATER
WITTGENSTEIN: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD viii (1987) ("The unhappy
state of Wittgenstein scholarship is in large part due to the fragmented and ahistorical character of
the potpourri of published remarks with which scholars have been working."). See also id. at 1-2, 6-
15. There are even questions as to how to group the writings. For example, after publishing a sec-
ond edition of certain remarks called Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein's
literary executors published a "revised" edition which contained wholly new material. Compare
LUDWIG WrrTGENSTEIN, REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS (G. H. von Wright, R.
Rhees & G.E.M. Anscombe eds., G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1967) with LUDWIG
WITGENSTEIN, REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS (G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees &
G.E.M. Anscombe eds., G.E.M. Anscombe trans., The MIT Press 2d ed. 1991) (rev. ed. 1978) [here-
inafter RFM].
23. See generally PI, supra note 19. See also infra note 72 and accompanying text.
24. See note 22, supra.
25. See GRAYLING, supra note 17.
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areas of Wittgenstein's later philosophy which have attracted lawyers' atten-
tion.
A. Meaning and Interpretation
A central concern of the Philosophical Investigations - used as a work
roughly representative of Wittgenstein's later philosophy - is an examina-
tion of the concept of meaning. The book opens with an examination of a
commonly held view of meaning: that words name things or actions, and
that sentences have meaning only if their words are put together according to
rules of grammar which adequately account for this naming.26 One problem
with this theory is that words do not always stand for things or actions, even
in simple declarative sentences. "Even Homer nods" would be nonsense
under this theory, for example, if there had never been a Greek poet named
Homer.27 Metaphors also fair badly under this theory. "Raining cats and
dogs" is almost universally understood in America to mean heavy rain, but I
doubt that canines and felines have ever fallen from the sky.
Unfortunately, this view of meaning lay at the heart of the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus - a work which is representative of Wittgenstein's
early philosophy, and which is the only philosophical book published during
Wittgenstein's lifetime.28 The Tractatus relied on what has been called the
picture theory of meaning, in which the logical simples of reality exist in a
strict isomorphism with the essential elements of language.29 In short, this
concordance between the atomistic parts of reality and the basic elements of
language allowed language to "picture" reality. In the years immediately
prior to 1929, Wittgenstein became dissatisfied with many of the conse-
quences of this view. In particular, he became convinced that its handling of
color and color gradations was unsatisfactory.3 °
26. PI, supra note 19, at §§ 1-27. See also LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR
56-57 (Rush Rhees ed., Anthony Kenny trans., 1974) [hereinafter PG].
27. Cf PI, supra note 19, at §§ 39-40.
28. GRAYLING, supra note 17, at 70. Cf. TLP, supra note 18, at § 4.05 ("Reality is compared
with propositions.").
29. Ironically, the picture theory owes something to law. Wittgenstein first formed the idea that
language models the world after reading a magazine article about a lawsuit in Paris. The case in-
volved an automobile accident, and the article described how the advocates had used miniature mod-
els of the cars and the location to describe the accident to the court. Wittgenstein's insight was to
transport this analogy to the tie between language and the world. The new analogy was that proposi-
tions serve as pictures of reality, much in the same way that the model of the accident served to pic-
ture the actual crash. VON WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 21; MONK, supra note 17, at 118.
30. ROBERT J. ACKERMAN, WIT-GENSTEIN'S CITY 72 (1988); JAMES BOGEN, WITrGENSTEIN'S
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: SOME ASPECTS OF ITS DEVELOPMENT 1 (1972).
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein starts by demonstrat-
ing how the lack of a referent for every word is not fatal to communication.3'
He goes on to argue for the proposition that communication exists on the ba-
sis of agreed conventions of word and sentence usage. In his words: "For a
large class of cases-though not for all-in which we employ the word
'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the lan-
guage. 32
One objection to this view is that, if adopted, it produces a rootless the-
ory of meaning. Because every speaker of language uses language differ-
ently, tying meaning to use entails that each word or phrase could have a dif-
ferent meaning for each speaker because each speaker could "use" it
differently. As Humpty Dumpty said to Alice, "When I use a word... it
means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less. 33 Some courts
have chosen to read Wittgenstein in this sort of Humpty Dumpty way.
34
Wittgenstein's answer to this objection is, in effect, to appeal to our ob-
servations on how we actually communicate. As he saw it, we communicate
through a web of interconnected customs and conventions, which Wittgen-
stein called "language games. 35 It is central to Wittgenstein's thought that
what knits these games together is not expressible by a general, abstract the-
ory of language-something he had tried in the Tractatus. He admits as
much:
Instead of producing something common to all that we call lan-
guage, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing, in
common which makes us use the same word for all,-but that they
are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because
of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all
"language".
36
31. He also points out that naming cannot be the foundation of meaning because we would first
have to grasp, through language, the concept of naming. GRAYLING, supra note 17, at 73.
32. PI, supra note 19, at § 43 (emphasis in original).
33. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 269 (Forum Books 1963). What follows
this quotation is also instructive. "'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean
so many different things.' [ ] 'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master-
that's all."'
34. See infra section IV.
35. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE BOOK 17, reprinted in PRELIMINARY STUDIES FOR THE
"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS" generally known as THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS (Rush Rhees
ed., Alden Press 2d ed. 1969) (1958) [hereinafter BBB]; see also PI, supra note 19, at §§ 7, 130; see
also G.H. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, WITrGENSTEIN: UNDERSTANDING AND MEANING 89-98 (Uni-
versity of Chicago Press ed., 1980). Although the scope of any language game is unclear, all lan-
guage games are linked in one language through connections which may fade with replication, but
which still can provide a traceable print. Wittgenstein called these connections family resemblances;
he drew analogies between cousins who appear differently, but still share common features with
their parents and with their grandparents. PI, supra note 19, at § 67; see also ACKERMAN, supra
note 30, at 82-83. Judge Bucklo has also used this metaphor when interpreting a local ordinance
against a First Amendment challenge. See Weigand v. Village of Tinley Park, 114 F. Supp. 2d 734,
738 (N.D. I11. 2000).
36. PI, supra note 19, at § 65 (emphasis in original).
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Language games can take many forms. They include primitive lan-
guages,37 as well as the whole of language taken together with the physical
actions made in concert with its use.38 Indeed, language is sufficiently rich
to include countless types of games.39 For Wittgenstein, language games in-
clude "[f]orming and testing a hypothesis," "[t]ranslating from one language
into another," and "[a]sking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying., 40
Wittgenstein also admits the possibility of "technical" languages which
describe a limited range of reality with intended precision and logic.
41
Speakers use language games, as well as words, phrase and gestures, ac-
cording to sets of conventions, or customs. These conventions and customs
regulate the contexts in which certain words or word groupings can be used
and not be nonsense. In short, these conventions and customs-what Witt-
genstein called "grammar"-weave words, phrases and language games into
the whole fabric of language.
Grammar in this sense in not a set of rules regarding verb declensions
and conjugations. Rather, it is more like an accounting of acceptable and
accepted uses of language.4" It governs the syntax of sense. Thus, Wittgen-
stein often refers to grammar to dissolve philosophical questions that are in-
capable of being answered because they lack a proper sense.43 In short, he
resorts to accepted usage and the internal relationships between and among
words to analyze a particular utterance. The effect is not unlike the process
by which an architect determines whether a particular bolt should be used to
fasten two beams. Some bolts-like some words-can be used in many dif-
ferent situations. Others are specially made for only a few. A trained archi-
tect-like a mature and competent speaker of a language-can select which
bolt, or word, is appropriate because it has been designed to apply to the par-
ticular case at hand.44
The relationship between the design and the use of the bolt and the par-
ticular situation is analogous to what Wittgenstein means by philosophical
37. Id. at § 7.
38. Id.
39. Id. at § 23.
40. Id.
41. Wittgenstein included "the use of charts and diagrams, descriptive geometry, [and] chemical
symbolism" in the class of such technical languages. BBB, supra note 35, at 81.
42. PG, supra note 26, at 87 ("Grammar is the account books of language. They must show the
actual transactions of language, everything that is not a matter of accompanying sensations.").
43. See, e.g., PI, supra note 19, part II, § xi, at 222 ("A whole cloud of philosophy condensed
into a drop of grammar."); see also LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY §§ 57-58, 313 (G.E.M.
Anscombe & G.H. von Wright eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1974) [hereinafter OC].
44. For a short description of Wittgenstein's grammar, see Norman Malcom, The Mystery of
Thought, reprinted in A WITrGENSTEIN SYMPOSIUM: GIRONA, 1989, at 53, 63-64 (Josep-Maria Ter-
ricabras ed., 1993). A longer exegesis is G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, WITTGENSTEIN: RULES,
GRAMMAR AND NECESSITY 34-64, 264-347 (1985).
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grammar.45  One would not use a screw where a bolt should go-even
though it seems to fit the hole-because that is simply not what the screw
was designed for. These limitations can be perceived as usage rules. Thus,
for Wittgenstein, "[g]rammar is a free-floating array of rules for the use of
language."'46
For Wittgenstein, grammar mediates our utterances with the world
around us.47 The conventions and rules of grammar ensure that what we
speak of is understood by those who listen-for their training, if similar to
ours, has inculcated in them the same rules. As Wittgenstein says: "Like
everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality is to be
found in the grammar of the language. 48 If this line of argument seems to
lead to the conclusion that no one way of expression is superior to others,
Wittgenstein is prepared to accept that. "The rules of grammar are arbitrary
in the sense that the rules of a game are arbitrary. We can make them differ-
ently. But then it is a different game. 49
But if grammar mediates between reality and language, how do we learn
grammar and acquire language? This question appears particularly thorny.
We were all children once, and each of us had to learn language. But if one
has to know language games to connect language games with reality, that
simply moves the question back to an investigation of how we acquire lan-
guage games.5 ° On this score, Wittgenstein's answer seems simple: we learn
how to apply words and phrases through observation, and through continued
45. See PI, supra note 19, at § 373 ("Grammar tells what kind of object anything is.").
46. BAKER, supra note 44, at 40; see also id. at 56. Cf Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophy, re-
printed in PHILOSOPHICAL OCCASIONS 1912-1951, 169 (James C. Klagge & Alfred Nordmann eds.,
1993) ("I could ask: why do I sense a grammatical joke as being in a certain sense deep? (And that
of course is what the depth of philosophy is.)") [hereinafter PO].
47. PG, supra note 26, at 97 ("The connection between 'language and reality' is made by defini-
tions of words, and these belong to grammar, so that language remains self-contained and autono-
mous."); see also id. at 190; P.M.S. Hacker, The Agreement of Thought and Reality, reprinted in
WrTGENSTEIN'S INTENTIONS 38 (John V. Canfield & Stuart G. Shanker eds., 1993); Robert Arring-
ton, The Autonomy of Language, reprinted in WrrGENSTEIN'S INTENTIONS, supra at 47; HILMY,
supra note 22, at 154-55; ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at 80; MERRILL B. HINTIKKA & JAAKKO
HINTIKKA, INVESTIGATING WITTGENSTEIN 221-24 (1986). Cf. TLP, supra note 18, at § 4.05 ("Real-
ity is compared with propositions.").
48. LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN, ZETTEL § 55 (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright eds., G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 1967) [hereinafter Z]. See PI, supra note 19, at § 445 ("It is in language that an
expectation and its fulfillment make contact."). See also ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at 48 ("Over a
long period of time, successful action is the strongest evidence we could have that our language has
some relationship with reality."). Professor Robert Arrington has a good exegesis of Section 445.
Robert L. Arrington, Making Contact in Language: The Harmony Between Thought and Language,
reprinted in WlTrGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS: TEXT AND CONTEXT 175 (Robert
L. Arrington & Hans-Johann Glock eds., 1991). Cf. PI, supra note 19, at § 206 ("The common be-
havior of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown lan-
guage.").
49. WtTTGENSTEIN'S LECTURES, CAMBRIDGE, 1930-32, FROM THE NOTES OF JOHN KING AND
DESMOND LEE 57 (Desmond Lee, ed. 1980) [hereinafter 1930 LECTURES]. Cf. OC, supra note 43, at
§ 229; PI, supra note 19, part I, § xi, at 223 ("If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.");
Z, supra note 48, at § 219 ("We don't understand Chinese gestures any more than Chinese sen-
tences."): see also ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at 83-84.
50. See HINTIKKA, supra note 47, at 213.
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practice and application.51 If others trained in language respond to what we
say in the way we wish them to respond, then we have learned at least one
use, and hence at least one meaning, of that word or phrase. We thus learn
language by trial and error, by induction and repetition. z
For simple situations, this account yields an adequate explanation. In a
caf6, if I say "coffee" to the server, and I get what I want, language works.
But in that same cafd, if I ask the server: "What did Wittgenstein mean by
'language game'?", I am not sure how to analyze any answer given. To pro-
duce an adequate explanation of the higher uses of language, or even of sim-
ple metaphor, Wittgenstein needs more. A simple one-to-one isomorphism
between logical simples and essential elements of reality is part of what the
Philosophical Investigations rejected. 53 One needs to explain how individu-
als can apply language to new situations.
In answer to this, Wittgenstein again returns to the game analogy. 4
Games have rules. That is, we conduct ourselves in games in certain ways
because we are precluded-under pain of losing or under pain of being ex-
cluded from the game-from other moves.55 In language, we use certain
words only in certain situations-under pain of not being understood or os-
tracized as simpletons.56 In our interactions with others, our obedience to
the customs and rules of language and the language games within it becomes
a practice. 7 We learn these practices by a method similar to induction.
From processing example after example, we learn acceptable usages, and
then can apply the usage in another situation.58 The usage of words and sen-
tences becomes ingrained in us, so that we do not think of what we are doing
when we communicate, or we deliberately juxtapose words to convey differ-
ent shades of meaning, shades not standard in our ordinary discourse.59 In
this sense, we follow rules of application for particular words-rules devel-
oped and maintained by the linguistic community to which we belong.
The counterintuitive aspect of this characterization is that these rules are
not transcendent. Because they can only be expressed in language, they can
never be outside of it.60 This, in turn, requires that forces which can alter
51. See PI, supra note 19, at §§ 143-44, 630; see also Z, supra note 48, at § 186; see also
ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at 192-93.
52. See PI, supra note 19, at §§ 5-6; BBB, supra note 35, at 77-78; PG, supra note 26, at 117-
118.
53. See PI, supra note 19, at § 46.
54. See id. at § 48.
55. See id.
56. See id. at § 665.
57. See id. at § 208; RFM, supra note 22, at 320-23.
58. PI, supra note 19, at § 199 ("To understand a language means to be master of a technique.").
59. See id. at § 445; see also PG, supra note 26, at 43 (discussing understanding of Lewis Car-
roll's poem "Jabberwocky"); see also GRAYLING, supra note 17, at 82-83.
60. See PI, supra note 19, at §§ 83-85; BAKER, supra note 44, at 329-38.
meanings in language, such as new usages or the development of different
customs, can also alter the substance of rules.6'
Understanding Wittgenstein's concepts of meaning and rule-following,
however, does not necessarily lead to an understanding of what someone
meant by a particular utterance. That is an act of interpretation, a winnow-
ing of a sort of all the possible uses of an utterance into one specific use.62
Wittgenstein had much less to say about interpretation than he did about
meaning, although what he did say was significant. In Philosophical Inves-
tigations, Wittgenstein states: "In a law-court, for instance, the question
might be raised how someone meant a word. And this can be inferred from
certain facts.-It is a question of intention. ,,63 This indicates that when in-
terpreting what someone has said---especially in the context of the law-one
can fix what was meant by a particular utterance. 64
As Wittgenstein said in connection with planning the treatment of psy-
chological verbs: "[p]sychological verbs [such as "to intend", "to mean",
and "to believe" are] characterized by the fact that the third person of the
present [e.g., "He means it"] is to be verified by observation, the first person
[e.g., "I mean it" is] not. '65 A common example in law would be the inter-
pretation of the words used in an oral contract. To determine the intent with
which they were used, one would look to the words used and the context in
which they were spoken. This context would include the grammar of the
words and the collective usages in the linguistic community in which they
were uttered.66
61. PG, supra note 26, at 184-85.
62. See HANS-JOHANN GLOCK, A WrrrGENSTEIN DICTIONARY 179-84 (1996) [hereinafter
GLOCK]
63. P1, supra note 19, part I, § xi, at 214 (emphasis in original). See also BAKER, supra note 44,
at 77-78. See also WlTTGENSTEIN'S LECTURES ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS:
CAMBRIDGE 1939, FROM THE NOTES OF R.G. BOSANQUET, NORMAN MALCOM, RUSH RHEES, AND
YORICK SMYTHIES 25 (Cora Diamond, ed. 1976).
I have been considering the word 'intend' because it throws light on the words 'under-
stand' and 'mean'. The grammar of the three words is very similar; for in all three cases
the words seem to apply both to what happens at one moment and to what happens in the
future.
Id. [hereinafter 1939 LECTURES.].
64. For Wittgenstein, intention was not a psychological state; one could not say that an intention
to do something involved a particular state of mind. "Did you intend.., refers to a definite time...
not to an experience during that time." PI, supra note 19, at 216-17. Cf BBB, supra note 35, at 147
("We use the words 'meaning', 'believing', 'intending' in such a way that they refer to certain acts,
states of mind given certain circumstances; as by the expression 'checkmating somebody' we refer
to the act of taking his king."). See also Z, supra note 48, at § 236; PG, supra note 26, at 143, 148;
LUDWIG WrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS 69 (Rush Rhees ed., Raymond Hargreaves &
Roger White trans., 1975) [hereinafter PR].
Robert Fogelin has noted that Wittgenstein's treatment of reconstructing what someone once
intended is problematic. He ascribes this difficulty to Wittgenstein's focus on first party psychologi-
cal concepts (such as what goes on when a particular speaker utters something) rather than third
party psychological concepts (such as my reconstructing what someone else meant by a past utter-
ance). ROBERT J. FOGELIN, WITTGENSTEIN 199 (2d ed. 1987). Of course, the function of a court
focuses primarily on such third party investigations.
65. Z, supra note 48, at § 472 (bracketed material not in original).
66. Cf id. at § 350.
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In short, divining intention is not a matter of divining psychological
states.67 Rather, it is a reconstruction of facts in accordance with linguistic
conventions to see if the parties' actions, in a strong sense, constitute the
claimed intent. 68 In this sense, interpretation is the converse of meaning. To
say one intended something by a particular utterance, one looks at the use of
language surrounding the event and the actions of the parties, rather than
what lawyers would call the subjective testimony of one party.69
B. Theory
This digression into meaning and interpretation suggests that Wittgen-
stein's methods were non-standard. The later Wittgenstein did not proceed
in axiomatic fashion with defined terms and with a superstructure based
upon derivation from the definitions or the axioms. 0 Indeed, he rejected this
method. For Wittgenstein, philosophy does not attempt to solve puzzles and
answer questions. Instead, it clarifies the usage of language so that we can
see the connections between words and their usage afresh and clearly, so that
the difference between sense and nonsense can be shown.7 1
Wittgenstein's approach can be understood as an attack on a venerable,
if much debated, philosophical issue: the existence of abstract or transcen-
dental entities.72 The classic exposition of this view is in Plato's Republic.
Wittgenstein's objection to such transcendentalism runs parallel to his objec-
tion about psychological explanations of meaning: he did not believe that
meaning could exist in the abstract, in part because there is nothing that can
A law is given for human beings, and a jurisprudent may well be capable of drawing con-
sequences for any case that ordinarily comes his way; thus the law evidently has its use,
makes sense. Nevertheless its validity presupposes all sorts of things, and if the being
that he is to judge is quite deviant from ordinary human beings, then e.g. the decision
whether he has done a deed with evil intent will become not difficult but (simply) impos-
sible.
Id. See also P1, supra note 19, at § 337 ("An intention is embedded in its situation, in human cus-
toms and institutions.").
67. Cf PI, supra note 19, at § 337; Z, supra note 48, at §§ 45, 48.
68. ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at 196-97. See OC, supra note 43, at § 441 ("In a court of law
the mere assurance 'I know ... ' on the part of a witness would convince no one. It must be shown
that he was in a position to know.").
69. PI, supra note 19, at § 692 ("For 'to mean it' did not mean: to think of it.").
70. Cf BAKER, supra note 44, at 485 ("It is characteristic of Wittgenstein's methods of philoso-
phizing that he rarely attacks a philosophical position by frontal assault, preferring, like all great
strategists, the 'indirect approach."').
71. Put another way, Wittgenstein was concerned with what constituted meaning generally, not
with what individual words meant. Cf PI, supra note 19, at §§ 120-26; Z, supra note 48, at § 467
("Our investigation does not try tofind the real, exact meaning of words; though we do often give
words exact meanings in the course of our investigation.") (emphasis in original).
72. G.E. Moore, Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933, 64 MIND 1, 9-10 (1955); BAKER, supra
note 44, at 668-70. See PO, supra note 46, at 158, 199.
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be set up as an external standard of correct language usage. As he says early
in the Philosophical Investigations:
And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be
anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with
all explanation, and description alone must take its place.... Phi-
losophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by
means of language.73
This gives rise to questions about how, or even whether, to use "theory."
Currently, we talk about theories in a number of overlapping contexts.74 In
one sense, theories can describe. That is, descriptive theories attempt to
make some sense out of, or find order in, seemingly chaotic data. The legal
realists attempted descriptions of this sort. They let us know what factors
they thought influenced legal decisions. Another example of this type of
theory is Llewellyn's opinion that the history of the English Constitution
could be written with reference to the relative case load of judges at different
points in history.75
Theories can also be formulated so as to predict future actions. If some-
one gives me the number sequence 2, 4, 6, and asks me what comes next, I
hypothesize that each successive number is two more than the previous
number to predict the next number to be 8. If this hypothesis proves to pro-
duce correct results, it is often said this theory or hypothesis explains the re-
lationship between the acts which preceded the result and the result.76 This
use of theory is most prevalent in sciences like engineering, in which theo-
ries produce predictions of what will happen, for example, if a stress is ap-
plied to a metal.77 Similarly, given the dynamic nature of evolving case law,
one can use a predictive theory to anticipate results in the future. Early ef-
forts to develop a "science" of law, characterized by the work of Harvard's
Christopher Columbus Langdell, may exemplify this use of theory in law. 8
Theories can also be used to justify abstractions or predictions. In these
cases, the theory acquires exclusivity. Not only is a prediction made, but it
is coupled with an assertion that the prediction and its attendant process is
the only correct process and result. Theories which justify are only of con-
73. Pl. supra note 19, at § 109. See also id. at § 119 ("The results of philosophy are the uncover-
ing of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by run-
ning its head up against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of the discov-
ery."), 126, 131; PG, supra note 26, at 66; BBB, supra note 35, at 18, 125; BAKER, supra note 44, at
481 (stating that if Wittgenstein's claims are correct, philosophy does not discover new facts, but
reveals the true face of nonsense). See also GLOCK, supra note 62, at 111-14.
74. This discussion owes much to Michael D. Bayles, What is Jurisprudence About? Theories,
Definitions, Concepts or Conceptions of Law?, 18 PHIL. Topics 23 (1990).
75. As quoted in WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 116
(1973). See also Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law,
4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 274 n.105 (1975).
76. BAKER, supra note 44, at 478.
77. Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy rejected the explanatory nature of science, and its
use of theories. P1, supra note 19, at § 109; BAKER, supra note 44, at 475.
78. See generally Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1983).
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cern when more than one theory potentially explains the world, and when
the competing theories yield different results. Then the exclusive nature of
the theory requires hegemony. This hegemony is normative: it seeks to
separate proper from improper conduct; or in the context of this paper,
proper readings of statutes from improper readings.79
Wittgenstein was committed to the first sense of theory, and to a rejec-
tion of the second and third senses. As he stated: "We must do away with all
explanation, and description alone must take its place. '80  He believed it
misleading to create a new abstraction to explain or justify the relation be-
tween two events or things. Inevitably, something is lost, and what is left
out can lead us astray. 81 For Wittgenstein, "[d]escription renounces theoreti-
cal abstraction. Wittgenstein wants to keep the differences, the jagged
edges, and accept what is obviously fragmentary, contextual and incom-
plete. ''8' The role of the philosopher is not to be partisan, but to use the con-
ventions and contexts of everyday language and experience to dispel or dis-
solve false problems and highlight true ones.83 By false problems I mean
those that arise because our cleverness outraces our understanding, because
we too quickly try to advance insights from one aspect of our experience to
another. One can imagine being momentarily captivated by the question:
"Where does the candle flame go to when it's blown out? ' 84 For Wittgen-
stein, this question is nonsensical. It contravenes basic assumptions neces-
sary to make sense of experience, and thus has no answer. Many questions
we pose about experience can be shown to be of this type-where to give or
attempt any answer is to perpetuate the error.
So what is a philosopher to do? As Robert Ackerman suggests, a lin-
guistic philosopher should stick to the description of various language
games. "A good book on philosophy would have the structure of a diction-
79. Cf PI, supra note 19, at § 131.
For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the model
as what it is, as an object of comparison-as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a pre-
conceived idea to which reality must correspond. (The dogmatism into which we fall so
easily in doing philosophy).
Id. (emphasis in original).
80. Id. at § 109 (emphasis in original). See also id. at § 128; PO, supra note 46, at 177-83;
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS ON AESTHETICS, PSYCHOLOGY AND
RELIGIOUS BELIEF 10 (Cyril Barrett ed., 1972). See also MARIE MCGINN, WIrrGENSTEIN AND THE
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 13-30 (1997); GLOCK, supra note 62, at 111-14.
81. See P.M.S. HACKER, WITITGENSTEIN'S PLACE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY ANALYTIC
PHILOSOPHY 130-35 (1996).
82. ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at 205.
83. Z, supra note 48, at § 455 ("(The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas.
That is what makes him into a philosopher.)"). See also ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at 209.
84. BBB, supra note 35, at 108. See also PG, supra note 26, at 126 ("'How do I know that the
colour red can't be cut into bits?"'); BAKER, supra note 44, at 281 ("Many syntactically permissible
structures are senseless because they lack any acceptable use.").
ary, not that of a logical system., 85 The attempt to "get outside" or create
something external to explain is not just inefficacious, it is wrong. The gen-
erality of theories masks their frailties due to their lack of completeness. As
Wittgenstein said, the aim of philosophy is "[t]o shew the fly the way out of
the fly-bottle"; 86 it is to show that many of the questions we ask cannot be
sensibly answered because they flout grammar. They appear to be well-
formed and logical, but are in fact nonsense.87
Left unaddressed by this discussion, of course, is any connection be-
tween Wittgenstein's philosophy and law. In simple terms, can Wittgen-
stein's philosophy illuminate the types of problems faced in legal practice?
Does law work better, or with different assumptions, after we hear the phi-
losophers out?
I want to answer this question affirmatively, but also indicate that not
all, or even most, invocation of Wittgenstein's name in examining law is
useful. To do this, I examine not only academic writings which cite Witt-
genstein's writings, but also the treatment his writings have received in judi-
cial opinions. The purpose of this inquiry, which immediately follows, is to
assess generally (but not exhaustively) the effect of Wittgenstein's philoso-
phy on the practice of law. Is it foppery, or something else?
III. FITTING WITrGENSTEIN INTO THE PRACTICE OF LAW: DENNIS
PATTERSON'S GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY
Professor Dennis Patterson's Good Faith and Lender Liability: Toward
a Unified Theory88 is an effort, in part, to use Wittgenstein's philosophy to
advance the state of commercial law theory.89 In particular, Good Faith and
85. ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at 211.
86. P1, supra note 19, at § 309. See also id. at § 90.
Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our
problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of
words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression
in different regions of language.-Some of them can be removed by substituting one
form of expression for another; this may be called an 'analysis' of our forms of expres-
sion, for the process is sometimes like one of taking a thing apart.
Id.
87. Cf. id. at § 38 ("For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday.") (empha-
sis in original).
88. DENNIS M. PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY: TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY
(1990) [hereinafter PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY].
89. The book borrows heavily from two previous articles. Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith,
Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 68 TEx. L. REv. 169 (1989) [hereinafter Patterson, Lender Liability]; Dennis M.
Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance and Enforcement Under
Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 335 (1988) [hereinafter, Patterson, Good Faith Performance].
Given the book's later publication date, I will refer to it as the primary source of Patterson's thought,
although this assumption is not without problems. See infra note 90.
Patterson has written elsewhere on the benefits of using theories developed in philosophy to
study legal problems. DENNIS M. PATrERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996) [hereinafter TRUTH]; Den-
nis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937 (1990)
[hereinafter Patterson, Law's Pragmatism]. See also WriTGENSTEIN AND LEGAL THEORY (Dennis
M. Patterson ed. 1992) (containing a version of Law's Pragmatism) [hereinafter LEGAL THEORY].
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Lender Liability applies Wittgenstein's philosophical theories, among others,
regarding the meaning of words and sentences to "reconceptualize" the
meaning of the term "good faith" in the UCC.90 Patterson wants to assert
that the term includes, in a very strong sense, "the notion of reasonable ex-
pectations against the background of ongoing practices." 91
I do not think that Patterson's effort succeeds. This lack of success is
due in part, I think, to his flawed reading of Wittgenstein. Moreover, even if
it were not flawed, I think Patterson's method is contrary to what Wittgen-
stein himself would have done, and that this calls into question his very use
of Wittgenstein to legitimize his views.
A. The Book
Patterson opens with a "genealogy, 92 of the UCC's view of the binding
nature of promises and the role of good faith in their interpretation. As a
prelude to his analysis of how Wittgenstein's philosophy can affect his view
of good faith, Patterson first examines the Code's flexible, relationship-
oriented focus. He ascribes the Code's perspective on this point to the ef-
forts of the Code's principal drafter: Karl Llewellyn.9 3
He is also the editor of an excellent collection of essays on the philosophy of law, A COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY (Dennis Patterson, ed., 1996). He has written separately
on good faith. Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable From the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good
Faith, 76 IOWA L. REV. 503 (1991). I have previously been critical of Professor Patterson's reading
of Wittgenstein. See Bruce A. Markell, Truth?, 72 IND. L.J. 1115 (1997) (reviewing DENNIS
PATTERSON, LAW & TRUTH).
90. His broader plan, however, draws heavily upon philosophical theories about meaning and
interpretation. The continuation of his theoretical work can be found in Patterson, Law's Pragma-
tism, supra note 89. See also TRUTH, supra note 89; Dennis M. Patterson, Explicating the Internal
Point of View, 52 SMU L. REV. 75 (1999); Dennis M. Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 254 (1992); Dennis M. Patterson, Toward a Narrative Conception of Legal Dis-
course, 5 SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY 61 (1991) [hereinafter Patterson, Legal Discourse]; Dennis M.
Patterson, Hegel and Postmodernity, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1665 (1989).
91. PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 88, at 7. See also id. at iU
("the traditional notion of 'reasonable expectation' is the core of good faith."); id. at 149 (formulat-
ing jury instruction regarding reasonable expectations); id. at 38 ("'good faith' is the protection of
expectations seen against the background of an ongoing practice, whose normative nature is properly
the subject of contestation and competing narrative accounts."). In addition, Patterson wants to look
to Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as an interpretive aid. Id. at 121, 147.
92. Id. at 11.
93. Among his sources for Llewellyn's views is an unpublished working paper of Llewellyn's.
Id. at 24 n.41. Patterson reprints this work as Appendix 2 to the book. Other portions of Lle-
wellyn's previously unpublished writings on the Uniform Sales Act have recently been published in
connection with the American Bar Association's task force on revision of Article 2 of the UCC.
Task Force of the A.B.A. Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Docu-
ments of Title, Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code, An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990,
Preliminary Report of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL J. CORP. L.
981, 1251 (1991).
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Patterson endeavors to show how Llewellyn consciously rejected both
the Willistonian view regarding the primacy of express terms and the modi-
fied subjective approach of Corbin, in which intent determined meaning. 94
In their place was the "great theoretical advance" that "the meaning of con-
tract language [is] derived from commercial context, from the fusion of the
intentions of individual actors with the background of evolving commercial
practices." 95 One key in this transformation was the role of good faith. Us-
ing a variety of Llewellyn's writings, Patterson concludes that "the tradi-
tional notion of 'reasonable expectation' is the core of good faith. 96 This
core also includes, in a very strong sense, "the notion of reasonable expecta-
tions against the background of ongoing practices. 97
To make his point, Patterson draws ties from Llewellyn's drafting to
Wittgenstein's philosophy. He asserts that Llewellyn's theory, so inter-
preted, entails that meaning is a function of words in context.9 8 For exam-
ple, disputes over whether a contract for the sale of chicken requires delivery
of broiling chicken, frying chicken or stewing chicken can be resolved only
by reference to the way others interested in the chicken trade use that term.99
As shown above,'t ° Wittgenstein makes a facially similar claim in the
Philosophical Investigations. Patterson believes that Wittgenstein's phi-
losophy, as exemplified by his statement that for a large class of cases a
word's meaning is its use,10' contains strong similarities to the way in which
Llewellyn looked at the world; indeed, he states that Wittgenstein's state-
ment "could just as easily have come from Llewellyn."'102 Based upon this
asserted identity of thought, Patterson interprets Wittgenstein to understand
Llewellyn so as to comprehend the Code's use of good faith.'0 3 Patterson's
development of his Wittgensteinian perspective starts with Section 43 of the
94. PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 88, at 14-18.
95. Id. at 18.
96. Id. at ix. At this point, it may be appropriate to ask when the tradition starts. As Patterson
acknowledges, id. at 104, the issue of good faith in commercial matters was initially raised in con-
nection with holder in due course status of commercial paper. See, e.g., Gill v. Cubitt, 107 Eng.
Rep. 806 (K.B. 1824) (rejecting objective standard). The result of those inquiries was the adoption
of a subjective standard, and even Revised Article 3 adopts this view. UCC § 3-302(a)(2)(ii) (2004).
97. PATrERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 88, at 7. Patterson also de-
scribes Llewellyn's vision of good faith as "consistency with the expectations of the parties meas-
ured against the background of commercial practice." Id. at 13. To use Patterson's metaphor:
"[Glood faith functions as a canvas on which the parties shape their agreement." Id. Patterson be-
lieves this conceptualization to be consistent with the general law of contracts. Id. at 33 n.64.
98. Id. at 35.
99. See Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(Friendly, J.) (interpreting the meaning of "chicken"-that is, the extent to which it included stewing
chickens-determined after examination of parties' negotiations, trade usage, and governmental
definitions).
100. See supra notes 35-80 and accompanying text.
101. PI, supra note 19, at § 43.
102. PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 88, at 35.
103. As Patterson states: "[T]he Wittgensteinian approach to the analysis of linguistic behavior
[is] employed in the reconceptualization of good faith", id. at 67, and, "A Wittgensteinian perspec-
tive is employed as a heuristic for developing the proposition that in order to know what a concept
means we first have to have some conception of the point or purpose that it serves in our discourse",
id. at 66. See also id. at 39-40.
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Philosophical Investigations quoted above: that meaning is use." One con-
sequence of this observation is that meaning is in large part a public affair.
Under Wittgenstein's theory, Patterson argues, one does not understand the
meaning of a word unless one can give a correct performance of it on appro-
priate occasions. 0 5 Correct performance, in turn, is assessed against a back-
ground of "public, intersubjective" practices. 1°6 The sum total of these pos-
sible interpretations, or as Patterson puts it, possible projections, is the
meaning of the word.'0 7
Patterson is quick to point out that this does not turn language into some
solipsistic morass, in which my intended meaning of a word is hidden by my
subjective intent.10 8 Rather, my utterances have effects, and the correspon-
dence between those utterances and the acts I desire form the nucleus of
meaning. If the linguistic community of which I am a member hears what I
say and then acts act in a way in which is consistent with my intent, and if I
react similarly to their utterances, this pattern and practice of checking the
result against reality provides limits to the subjective. Rules of inference
and practice, called "language-games" by Wittgenstein, midwife this trans-
formation. 09
It thus becomes important for Patterson to focus on Wittgenstein's han-
dling of rule-following in language games since he believes that Wittgen-
stein's discussion of that practice has strong parallels to following a stat-
ute.' 0 If a part of an expression or order seems vague or ambiguous, there
are rules one can follow to resolve the issue. But, as Patterson asserts, rules
make sense only because there is a common history and a set of reasons for
their place in the discourse."' Knowing the reasons or point of a rule en-
ables us to "go on" and apply it to new and unforeseen circumstances. 12
At this point, a simple-minded analysis of the Code would simply exam-
ine the legislative history as used in the relevant state to determine the
"point" or the "reasons" for any particular Code section."13 Patterson rejects
104. Id.
105. Id. at 68-69.
106. Id. at 69.
107. Id. at 73. Cf. Z, supra note 48, at § 467 ("Our investigation does not try tofind the real, exact
meaning of words; though we do often give words exact meanings in the course of our investiga-
tion.") (emphasis in original).
108. This reflects Wittgenstein's goal of disassociating meaning from physiological or psycho-
logical states. As Wittgenstein put it: "If God had looked into our minds he would not have been
able to see there whom we were speaking of." PI, supra note 19, part II, § xi, at 217.
109. PAT ERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 88, at 76.
110. Id. at 82.
111. Id. at 85-86.
112. Id. at86.
113. Cf. Z, supra note 48, at § 48 ("Might it not even be imagined that several people had carried
out an intention without any one of them having it? In this way a government may have an intention
that no man has.") (emphasis in original).
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this approach. He asserts that with respect to a statute like the Code, the
point of any rule within it is not reducible to the intentions of legislatures or
common law courts."' His vantage point is much broader: all of legal dis-
course. This includes traditional concepts of legislative intent, but also em-
braces subsequent actions based upon the statute, analytical commentary,
and the actions of merchants. In short, it seems to include anything that
could be used to justify some action with respect to the statute in question.
With his sources thus expanded, Patterson next attempts to connect the
Code's definition of good faith to a background of reasonable commercial
practices. He begins by trotting out the Code's drafting history surrounding
the current definition of good faith as honesty in fact. 1 5 He argues, from the
comments, that the definition was intended to be necessary, but not suffi-
cient." 6  That is, good faith always requires honesty, but honesty is not
enough. Patterson then analogizes to the text of Section 205 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts for its treatment of the implied duty of good
faith, and finds that it incorporates notions of reasonable expectations of the
parties; it "articulate[s] several of the purposes that 'good faith' is intended
to serve.""'  From this, we are to infer that the Restatement version is the
modem, evolved version of the Code's concept of good faith." 
8
Patterson thus states that the concept of good faith is "amenable to
reconceptualization on nonlegislatively based axiological models [if], as
with good faith, those models are consistent with the specific value choices
articulated in the Code."" 9 I take this to mean that one can propose an in-
114. PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 88, at 86 n.65.
115. Id. at 104-06.
116. Id. at 107.
117. Id. at 109. He does not discuss, however, that Section 205 finds not only a duty of good
faith, but also a duty of fair dealing. It is not difficult to suggest that the objectivity inherent in the
Restatement view can be based upon this addition.
118. Oddly, Patterson views this discourse in a crabbed fashion. After summarizing the Restate-
ment's position on good faith as embodying each party's "justified expectations," Patterson then
picks a strange community against which to test these expectations. Id. He states that the determi-
nation of the reasonableness of a lender's actions "should be determined by reference to the 'com-
munity' of which the secured party is a member: the financial community." Id. at 110-11 (internal
citations omitted). But what about the other half of the transaction? In short, what role should the
borrower's community play? Patterson's restriction of the relevant community to the secured
party's seems at odds with his goal of shared expectations.
This restriction is even stranger when compared to the parallel section of Good Faith Perform-
ance. There, Patterson had stated that what is reasonable "should be determined by reference to the
financial community, the 'community' of which the secured party, and possibly the debtor, is a
member." Id. at 386 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Thus, since Good Faith Per-
formance predates GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY, it would seem that the exclusion of the
debtor's community was deliberate.
119. Patterson, Good Faith Performance, supra note 89, at 393. To avoid the argument that his
theory trivializes the role of legislatures, Patterson sketches an "enlarged view of the constitutive
nature of the relationship between courts and legislatures." PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER
LIABILITY, supra note 88, at 118. Through the use of two charts, id. at 114-16, Patterson attempts to
demonstrate that the meaning of "good faith" in the Code-or for that matter, the meaning of any
term in any legislation-"in any context is a direct function of the historically situated reader's abil-
ity to recover the subjective intent (Geist) of a (the) legislative subject(s). The recovery of that in-
tent, the mens auctoris, is the gravamen of the disclosure and discernment of textual meaning." Id.
(internal citations omitted). Patterson accepts that this theory diminishes the role of the legislature,
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terpretation of good faith which goes beyond the Code's definition of sub-
jective honesty, and deny opponents refuge in any plain meaning theory.
The consequences of this position are a bit unclear. Patterson applies
his theory in Part II of the book, entitled Doctrine,120 but it is not until page
149, some twenty-four pages into his discussion of how to apply Part I, that
Patterson gives us his test. Formulated as a jury instruction to test the com-
mercial reasonableness of any particular interpretation of a contract provi-
sion, it is as follows:
Given what the parties each knew, and with a full appreciation of
the several sources for the meaning of the original Agreement,
which of the two proposed reconstructions of the meaning of the
original Agreement is consistent with the original materials?1
21
B. Patterson's Fidelity to Wittgenstein
Patterson's test is a far cry from the Code's definition of good faith as
"honesty in fact.' ' 122 But does it explain how courts, lawyers and legislatures
treat statutes? I doubt it. Does it give us a convincing alternate system for
statutory interpretation? I again must answer in the negative.
I initially want to show that what I view as confusions in Patterson's
analysis of Wittgenstein doom Patterson's analysis of the Code. Moreover,
even if Patterson got his Wittgenstein right, he fails to account sufficiently
for legal structure to profitably transport his philosophical analysis from phi-
losophy to law.
Patterson's problems start with his extension of an analogy made by
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein observed that "[f]ollowing a rule is analogous to
obeying an order., 123 Patterson picks up on this analogy in order to extend
and essentially entails that legislative value choices do not control the interpretation of statutes: "leg-
islative purpose is but one element in the mix of legal discourse." Id. at 119 (emphasis added). This
discourse, in turn, is in part between the courts and the legislature, and is the nature of this discourse
is captured by the metaphor of "conversation." Id. at 119-20. Given the Code's receptiveness to
new commercial practices, this leaves the Code "open to discursive possibilities beyond its four cor-
ners." Id. at 120.
120. Id. at 125-98.
121. Id. at 149.
122. As defined in the Uniform Commercial Code at the time Patterson analyzed it, the Code pro-
vided that "'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." UCC § 1-
201(19) (2000). In connection with the 2001 revisions to Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the definition has been expanded to add an objective component. § 1-201(20) (2001) ("'Good
faith,' except as otherwise provided in Article 5, means honesty in fact and the observance of rea-
sonable commercial standards of fair dealing."). Although some states have declined to adopt parts
of Article 1, this change in the text of the Code could be seen as vindication for Patterson's views,
although I argue, infra at text accompanying notes 132-71, that such a view is questionable.
123. PI, supra note 19, at § 206.
Wittgenstein's notions on rule-following to obeying a statute. 24 In short, he
wants to insert "statute" for "order" in the above quotation. But this exten-
sion is inconsistent with Wittgenstein's use and development of the notions
of rule-following. Wittgenstein was worried about rule-following because
he was devoted to eradicating the idea that meaning is a mental activity pri-
vate to the speaker. He thus wanted non-psychological criteria for mean-
ing.' 25 To that end he explored what it is to follow a linguistic rule with the
goal of severing meaning from mental activity. 
126
Patterson uses this material, and distills from it the following equiva-
lency: "[a]cting... in accordance with a rule is a practice. ,,127 As far as
that statement goes, it is not objectionable. But Patterson defines practice as
having a psychological component; he states that practice "is a matter of
having and giving reasons for action." 128 Patterson believes that we are jus-
tified in our selection of the correct interpretation by our "training" in lan-
guage. 129 Thus, he concludes, "[k]nowing the reasons or the point of the rule
enables us to 'go on' and apply it to new and previously unforeseen circum-
stances.' 3 °  This insight then forms the basis of Patterson's analytical
framework of good faith: in order to know what good faith means, we need
to consider the purpose that term serves in legal discourse.131
Patterson's link between knowing purpose and being able to understand
meaning has critical consequences for law. If adopted, it is the death knell
for plain meaning in statutory interpretation 3 2 and the four comers rule in
124. Patterson is not the first to analyze Wittgenstein's concepts of rule-following. H.L.A. Hart
referred to Sections 208-38 of the Philosophical Investigations and their descriptions of rule-
following in his germinal work, The Concept of Law. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 249
(1961).
125. Indeed, as Professor Robert Fogelin has noted, much of the Philosophical Investigations is an
attempt to disabuse us from the view that meaning has a psychological component. FOGELIN, supra
note 64, at 153-54. See also Z, supra note 48, at § 472.
126. See supra section HI (B).
127. PATTERSON, GOOD FArrH AND LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 88, at 84.
128. Id. at 84-85.
129. Id. at 85.
130. Id. at 86.
131. Id. Patterson makes a similar claim in TRuTH where he states that a proposition of law "is
true if a competent legal actor could justify its assertion." TRUTH, supra note 89, at 152. I have
criticized this approach. Markell, supra note 89.
132. The Supreme Court seems particularly interested in a plain meaning interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).
We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute
what is means and means in a statute what it says there.... When the words of a statute
are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: "judicial inquiry is complete."
Id. (Thomas, J.).
At least one other Justice sees the debate as having far-reaching implications:
[T]he phenomenon [of raising far-fetched interpretations of seemingly unambiguous text]
calls into question whether our legal culture has so far departed from attention to text, or
is so lacking in agreed-upon methodology for creating and interpreting text, that it any
longer makes sense to talk of "a government of laws, not of men.". I trust that in our
search for a neutral and rational interpretive methodology we have now come to rest, so
that the symbol of our profession may remain the scales, not the see-saw.
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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parol evidence. I may be sympathetic with these goals. I do not, however,
think a close reading of Wittgenstein supports them.
Patterson, I think, confuses following a rule in language games with fol-
lowing rules contained in statutes. 133 As indicated above, 134 Wittgenstein did
not indicate that considered rules and practices which could be looked up
and then followed. Cognition of the rule being applied was not essential;
indeed, it was excluded. For Wittgenstein, following a grammatical practice
or obeying a linguistic rule is almost unconscious; as he states: "to think one
is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule."'135 Or in another context: "When I
obey a rule, I do not choose. [[] I obey the rule blindly."'
136
As David Pears has said:
My obedience is blind not because I shut out consideration that
might have influenced me, like the officers who lead the Charge of
the Light Brigade, but because, when I have worked my way down
to the foundations, where the only question left is 'What in this case
would count as the same again?', there are no more considerations,
doubts or justifications. I do not even have to listen to the rule, be-
cause it speaks through my application of it.
137
One way to illustrate the problem is to imagine two robbers who, in or-
der to avoid detection, create a code in which they agree to change the
names of the prospective victim when in public. Do we wish to say that
when the two robbers utter the changed names in public they are following a
rule? I do not think so, at least not in the elemental sense suggested by
Wittgenstein. But, on the other hand, their discourse is not meaningless
simply because they do not obey the convention of only calling people by
their given names. 38 By consent, these individuals have created a special
language game in which real names are switched for aliases. Those who do
not know the game may be confused by their conversations, but that is insuf-
ficient to deny their utterances meaning.
133. "Just as J.L. Austin showed that it is proper to ask after the point of an utterance, it is basic to
the practice of law to ask the interpretive question 'what is the point of the rule."' Patterson, Legal
Discourse, supra note 88, at 63.
134. See supra section II (B).
135. PI, supra note 19, at § 202.
136. Id. at § 219 (emphasis in original).
137. 2 DAVID PEARS, THE FALSE PRISON: A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF WrTGENSTEIN'S
PHILOSOPHY 441 (1980). See also BAKER, supra note 44, at 159, 169, 171-72 (discussing the con-
cept of praxis). As Joseph Cowan said: "There is no such thing as behavior guided by, or even ac-
cording to, a rule." Joseph L. Cowan, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Logic, 70 PHIL. REV. 362, 364
(1961).
138. Cf PI, supra note 19, part 11, § xi, at 214.
Language is sufficiently rich to allow within it many games, even those
which by design vary conventions held in language generally. 39 Speakers
can consent to variations, or variations can arise through repeated usage.
For example, the comment at a sporting event that a particular player is
"bad" can either mean the player stinks or is wonderful. The practices and
experiences of the parties will help find the intended result.
Patterson's view does not sufficiently account for this ability to create
language games that contain practices incorporating knowing and intentional
variances from general usage. If he is correct that the Code's concept of
good faith is essentially objective, then its mandatory nature would seem at
odds with the Code's general promotion of party autonomy, certainty and
regularity of dealings.1 40 Agreeing in advance on definitions, and also agree-
ing not to vary those definitions, would seem to be an essential element of
this goal. It is not unlike disabling non-essential features of a tool to ensure
that future users of that tool will use it only in certain, intended ways.
This effort to promote certainty of result and stability of interpretation
can be seen from the Code's own treatment of good faith. Although the duty
of good faith cannot be disclaimed when applicable, the Code permits the
parties to fix standards for its application in advance.' 4' Thus, if parties wish
to adopt a standard different than that used in the market place, they may.
This is my point of departure from Patterson. Patterson seems to believe
that the duty of good faith imports a standard of reasonableness into Article
9 agreement, regardless of the parties' intent. I disagree. While my reading
is the most straightforward given the subjectivity inherent in the words cho-
sen by the Code to define good faith, I also think Wittgenstein's philosophy
supports my reading.
Patterson treats the Code as though it were an indistinguishable subset
of everyday English language, and thus subject to all the rules and influences
that can affect language. I take issue with this assumption. 42 While the
Code is formed of English words, it is more. It is a highly artificial construct
designed to bring systematic organization to commercial law. In this respect
I think that it resembles, to use Wittgenstein's terms, a highly-structured
language game that is but one of the myriad language games that make up
the English language. 1
43
Wittgenstein was not particularly helpful in defining language games, in
large part because he believed that no adequate account, or theory, describ-
ing such games could be produced.'" He does, however, give us some ex-
139. P1, supra note 19, at § 23.
140. "Subsection (3) [of UCC § 1-102] states affirmatively at the outset that freedom of contract is
a principle of the Code: 'the effect' of its provisions may be varied by 'agreement."' The Code goes
on to state that the "meaning of the statute itself must be found in its text, including its definitions,
and in appropriate extrinsic aids; it cannot be varied by agreement." UCC § 1-102 cmt. 1 (2004).
141. UCC § 1-102(3) (2004).
142. Cf Bix, supra note 89, at 209, 216 (criticizing Brian Langille for talking about the "grammar
of law" without sufficient appreciation for the change in context between Wittgenstein's uses and
Langille's argument.).
143. Cf BBB, supra note 35, at 81. See also Markell, supra note 89, at 1130-31.
144. BOGEN, supra note 30, at 201. Cf HINTIKKA, supra note 47, at 215-16 (arguing that for the
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amples, and these are telling: "Giving orders, and obeying them...
[c]onstructing an object from a description... [t]ranslating from one lan-
guage into another... ,,"' He also speaks of "special technical languages,"
giving as examples "the use of charts and diagrams, descriptive geometry,
chemical symbolism, etc."'' 46 In each of these games, one can say that the
participants understand what conduct is appropriate given particular utter-
ances. Coming to attention when a superior officer barks the order or build-
ing a toy for your children from the instructions each involve relating action
to a stimulus based upon the intentions of the parties.
Similarly, I believe that the Uniform Commercial Code is a purposeful
construct which can best be described as a language game unto itself.
147
While the Code imports most of its rules and practices from the English lan-
guage, it also modifies some of those rules. In particular, in order to pro-
mote certainty and stability, the Code sometimes uses words in a much dif-
ferent way than would be justified by resort to ordinary language.1 48  In
addition, the parties may increase this deviation; they may fix the meaning
of their terms by excluding other interpretations or by affirmatively adopting
their own standards. 149 If all of this means that the words become brittle and
later Wittgenstein semantics was ineffable, and that "the only aspects of language-games one can
meaningfully speak of.. . are its external, nonsemantical features .. "); see also PI, supra note 19,
at § 23.
But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command?-
There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols",
"words", "sentences". And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all;
but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence,
and others become obsolete and get forgotten.
Id. (emphasis in original).
145. PI, supra note 19, at § 23.
146. BBB, supra note 35, at 81. 1 have previously argued that codes such as the Uniform Com-
mercial Code can be viewed as types of language games. Markell, supra note 89, at 1130.
147. Cf BBB, supra note 35, at 81; Z, supra note 48, at § 644. I have previously sketched this
theory in Markell, supra note 89.
148. An example is that, under Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 11:59 p.m. is consid-
ered to be in the "afternoon." U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(2) (2004) ("'Afternoon' means the period of a day
between noon and midnight.").
149. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-302 (2004):
SECTION 1-302. VARIATION BY AGREEMENT
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or elsewhere in [the Uniform
Commercial Code], the effect of provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code]
may be varied by agreement.
(b) The obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by
[the Uniform Commercial Code] may not be disclaimed by agreement. The parties,
by agreement, may determine the standards by which the performance of those ob-
ligations is to be measured if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
Whenever [the Uniform Commercial Code] requires any action to be taken within a
reasonable time, a time that is not manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by agree-
ment.
(c) The presence in certain provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code] of the
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monochromatic, so be it. The periodic efforts to revise the Code anticipate
this, and these revisions tend to conform usage to reality.
1 50
Under this view, the world of Article 9 security agreements divides
roughly into two groups. The first group consists of those agreements in
which the parties have dealt expressly with the standard of good faith. By
this I mean that they have agreed in advance as to the appropriateness of a
standard against which to assess proffered performance, or attempted en-
forcement. The second group consists of those agreements in which they
have not so expressed a standard.
The first category is not particularly interesting. In such agreements, the
parties have adopted a language game in which they have agreed to hold
firm to some practice in interpreting good faith. In short, they have agreed
on a language game consisting of a test for determining the appropriateness
of performance or of enforcement. The question in any dispute is to dis-
cover and apply the rules of that language game.
By contrast, I believe parties in the second group adopt the Code's sub-
jective definition of good faith; that is the default rule unless the parties
agree otherwise. Resolution of disputes in this class of cases dissolve into
questions of intention. Did a secured party honestly believe that enforce-
ment would be appropriate for covenants for which the parties were in de-
fault before they signed? Did a debtor honestly believe in a fifteen day
grace period for periodic installments?
Prior to 2001, these questions of good faith were referred to and decided
by the Code's subjective standard. 51 In many cases, my views and Patter-
son's views will be the same. They will differ in the Article 9 context in
those cases in which a custom or practice is not sufficiently widespread to
rise to the level of incorporation. Differences will also arise when a custom
is not incorporated and a party honestly, but unreasonably, attempts to en-
force a contractual term. After 2001, the revisers of Article 1 modified the
definition of good faith, retaining the subjective portion, but adding an ob-
jective element. In addition to honest belief, the U.C.C. now requires "the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."'12  Is this
addition what Patterson held was already in the former section? Although
phrase "unless otherwise agreed", or words of similar import, does not imply that
the effect of other provisions may not be varied by agreement under this section.
150. The amendment to the definition of good faith in the 2001 revision to the U.C.C. is discussed
infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
151. But the matter does not end there. The parties' agreement, as defined in the Code, may have
incorporated terms regarding performance or enforcement; the sources of these terms include trade
custom and usage, as well as the parties' prior dealings. Although implied by the Code, these incor-
porated terms are no less part of the parties' agreement. The court, even if the parties proceeded
with a pure heart, still has to determine whether these terms are part of the agreement. If a party
demands a certain performance when trade custom in similar matters is to the contrary, this is not
bad faith but simply an unwitting breach of an implied term of the agreement-other than the obliga-
tion to act honestly implied by Section 1-203. For example, if trade custom allows debtors to pay by
regular check, a lender would be in default of that implied term if it sought to enforce default reme-
dies upon tender of the check, not because the lender violated its duty of good faith, but because the
lender breached the implied obligation of accepting regular checks.
152. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2004).
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the closeness of content cannot be disputed, I think Patterson's rather open-
ended re-articulation is not fully reflected in the 2001 amendments. First,
note that the 2001 revision did not adopt a general objective standard - an
obligation to act reasonably. Rather, the text of the amendments added a
somewhat narrower requirement: that the action be consistent with objective
"commercial standards of fair dealing."
What is the difference? It might lie in those cases in which one party in-
sists on a particular rule of interpretation that is contrary to customary usage
or trade usage; if the other party agrees to this objectively non-standard rule,
it can hardly be said to be a violation of "fair dealing." The standard then
collapses into the subjective standard, that is, whether the party honestly be-
lieved that its standard was agreed to, and therefore applicable. 153
I think Wittgenstein' s view of language is consistent with these observa-
tions about the Code's use of language. As Wittgenstein states in the Phi-
losophical Investigations:
In a law-court, for instance, the question might be raised how some-
one meant a word. And this can be inferred from certain facts-It is
a question of intention. 114
This passage indicates that when interpreting past acts, especially in the
context of the law, one can fix meanings. 155 To do so, one refers to "certain
facts"-presumably the permissible uses of the words employed, and the
circumstances under which the parties uttered the words. 5 6 In the language
153. See, e.g., Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981) (incor-
porating the practice of price protection into the contract even though express terms of contract
seemed to exclude such protection); id. at 806 (explaining that incorporation of terms based on trade
usage depends on a showing that such practices were widespread). Then-Judge Kennedy stated:
"Our opinion should not be interpreted to permit juries to import price protection or a similarly spe-
cific contract term from a concept of good faith that is not based on well-established custom and
usage or other objective standards of which the parties had clear notice." Id. (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
154. PI, supra note 19, part II, § xi, at 214 (emphasis in original). See also BAKER, supra note 44,
at 77-78.
155. For Wittgenstein, intention was time specific: "Did you intend.., refers to a definite time...
not to an experience during that time." PI, supra note 19, at 217-18. Cf BBB, supra note 35, at 147
("We use the words 'meaning', 'believing', 'intending' in such a way that they refer to certain acts,
states of mind given certain circumstances; as by the expression 'checkmating somebody' we refer
to the act of taking his king."). See also Z, supra note 48, at § 236; PG, supra note 26, at 143, 148;
PR, supra note 64, at 69.
Robert Fogelin has noted that Wittgenstein's treatment of reconstructing what someone once
intended is problematic. He ascribes this difficulty to Wittgenstein's focus on first party psychologi-
cal concepts (such as what goes on when a particular speaker utters something) rather than third
party psychological concepts (such as my reconstructing what someone else meant by a past utter-
ance). FOGELIN, supra note 64, at 199. Of course, the function of a court focuses primarily on such
third party investigations.
156. Cf Z, supra note 48, at § 350.
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game of the UCC, this may or may not include testimony as to the subjective
intent of the parties. 57 But Patterson expressly rejects this move. "In con-
struing the meaning of a contract, courts should focus their attention not on
what the parties mentally intended by their words but on what the trade took
the words to mean. 158 In short, Patterson seems to confuse the meaning of a
word with what a person meant by its utterance.
Patterson's view essentially seeks to incorporate shifting perceptions of
commercial practice into the notion of good faith. Under his view, "reason-
able expectations" can fill gaps left by parties' failure to agree in a manner
we can reconstruct without quarrel.' 59 But this view was clearly rejected by
Wittgenstein:
Is a statute book a work of anthropology telling how the people of
this nation deal with a thief, etc.--Could it be said: "The judge
looks up a book about anthropology and thereupon sentences the
thief to a term of imprisonment"? Well, the judge does not USE the
statute book as a manual of anthropology.
60
But Patterson seems to want to import "anthropology" into statutory con-
struction.' 6' Under his theory, evidence of how traders act (or put another
way, the reports of anthropologists consigned to study commercial practices
with respect to how traders act) will be in many cases determinative of the
issue. 162 Statutes can admit such evidence, but they usually do it explicitly,
such as in Section 1-205 of the Code. But it is a feature of language games
as conceived by Wittgenstein that they can exclude such references as
well. 16 3 Section 1-201(19) and the history of its adoption seem to be one
such exclusion.
Patterson confuses the possibility that a Code term will acquire and lose
certain interpretations over time with the likelihood that the parties agreed
on the scope of that same term in a contract at a particular point in time (by
A law is given for human beings, and a jurisprudent may well be capable of drawing con-
sequences for any case that ordinarily comes his way; thus the law evidently has its use,
makes sense. Nevertheless its validity presupposes all sorts of things, and if the being
that he is to judge is quite deviant from ordinary human beings, then e.g. the decision
whether he has done a deed with evil intent will become not difficult but (simply) impos-
sible.
Id.
157. See UCC § 1-201(19) (2004) (defining good faith as honesty in fact).
158. PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 88, at 18, 149.
159. Id. at 149 (rejecting that actual state of mind of parties to a contract is relevant to inquires as
to good faith interpretation of the propriety of performance.).
160. RFM, supra note 22, part 1, at § 65. See also id., part I, at § 118.
161. "[I1n law the determination of what a rule requires (what it means to claim that "'X' is fol-
lowing [or not following] a rule") is made by disclosing the point of the rule. This 'disclosure' is
essentially a matter of social anthropology." Patterson, Legal Discourse, supra note 90, at 62
(brackets and emphasis in original).
162. See supra note 158.
163. See U.C.C. 1-205 (2004).
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implication or otherwise).' 64 Patterson's interpretive tool for the Code is
thus not sufficiently true to the Code's effort to promote certainty in com-
mercial transactions. Although the use of commercial practices to interpret
the intent of the parties is useful-of that there can be no denial-those prac-
tices cannot unsettle divisions of labor made by the Code itself. For what-
ever reason, before 2001 the Code defined good faith as honesty in fact, and
not as the satisfaction of reasonable commercial standards. 165
There are at least two consequences of Patterson's flawed reading of
Wittgenstein. The first consequence is that Patterson's argument about rule-
following loses much of its force. As I point out above, it is not the case, as
Patterson apparently asserts, 166 that rule-following in language is a conscious
act-much in the same way that it does not make sense to ask whether
Tuesday or Wednesday is fat or lean. 167 The grammar of language governs
both cases; it is simply not the case that common usage allows us to say that
either day is hefty or lean. The process by which we label such assertions
non-sensical involves what Wittgenstein would call rule-following. 168 Thus,
while it may be productive under theories other than those of Wittgenstein to
ask what the point or purpose of a rule is, there is no firm connection be-
tween that endeavor and Wittgenstein's investigations into language.
The second consequence is that Patterson's concentration on rule-
following blinds him to other characterizations of the Code. As I have set
forth above, the Code can be viewed as one of the myriad language games
that contribute to English-perhaps a "technical" language game169 or one in
which some moves allowed in English are denied in the Code. 170 If either of
these characterizations are true, Patterson's goal of making good faith in-
quiries objective through application of a contextual theory of meaning fails,
not because the theory is wrong, but because Patterson's chosen context is
cast too wide. I believe that Wittgenstein would resort to intent to resolve
this issue,17' and while the whole of language contains many necessary as-
164. He also confuses establishing a possible meaning of "good faith" with how "good faith" is
actually used by courts.
165. It also may be that good faith is an evaluative concept which will vary across different ethical
systems, so as to always be the center of dispute. See PAUL JOHNSTON, WrIrrGENSTEIN AND MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 99-101 (1989); Bix, supra note 142, at 222-23.
166. PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 88, at 84-86.
167. The example is Wittgenstein's. PI, supra note 19, part II, § xi, at 216. Wittgenstein "in-
cline[d] decisively" towards a fat Wednesday. Id.
168. Id. at § 85 ("A rule stands there like a sign-post.... [T]he sign-post does after all leave no
room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not. And now this is
no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one.").
169. BBB, supra note 35, at 81.
170. I have expanded on this theory elsewhere. See generally Markell, supra note 89.
171. PI,supra note 19, part1, §xi, at 214.
829
sumptions for this quest, 7 2 the information possessed by the parties will of-
ten be determinative.
C. The Use of Theory
Even if Patterson's interpretation of Wittgenstein is superior to mine,
which it well may be, I still find Patterson's conclusions unsatisfactory for at
least two additional reasons. First, although it requires speculation of the
highest sort, I think Wittgenstein would not have approved of Patterson's
use and development of theory to explain the Code. 173  For Wittgenstein,
philosophy did not attempt to solve puzzles and answer specific questions;
instead, it clarified the usage of language so that we can see problems afresh
and clearly. 174 Second, while Patterson's work may be valuable as a seman-
tic analysis of the Code, he seems to attempt more a normative theory of
how courts ought to interpret the words "good faith." The transition from a
semantic exposition of the Code to a normative precept of interpretation pro-
ceeds too far, too fast, and ultimately crumbles in this haste.
I do not think that Patterson's use of theory in a way contrary to Witt-
genstein's spirit is fatal, so long as what is done is made explicit. No rule
says that brilliant philosophers such as Wittgenstein are always right. But in
extrapolating from Wittgenstein, Patterson confuses his method with his
goal. He begins with solid semantic observations about word usage in the
Code.175 He slices and dices these observations, however, to formulate what
most lawyers would label policy arguments about Code interpretation. I
think this move is not wholly legitimate, and thus reject it.
172. Cf. Z, supra note 48, at § 350.
173. Patterson acknowledges Wittgenstein's rejection of theorizing, and even attempts to rechar-
acterize his endeavor:
What I offer is more an "account" or, as Wittgenstein would have it, a "description" of
the grammar of legal expression. What is offered is not a "theory" about language. In-
stead, the effort is directed at describing linguistic practice and giving an accurate ac-
count of it. In the end, the effort is pragmatic and not theoretical.
PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 88, at 61 n. 1.
This statement does not appear in the correlated footnote in Patterson, Good Faith Performance. See
Patterson, Good Faith Performance, supra note 89, at 352 n.56.
With all respect, I do not know how much weight can be given to Patterson's disclaimer. A
book of descriptions would look a lot different than Patterson's. I also doubt that offering a pro-
posed jury instruction, PATrERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 88, at 149, fits
within any usage of the word "description." See also id. at ix (bemoaning the "low state of theory in
commercial law" and stating his purpose as "advanc[ing] the outline of a general theory .. "). Pat-
terson also acknowledges this by calling his work "simultaneously prescriptive and descriptive." Id.
at 62 n. 1. In Good Faith Performance he adds the tag line "and therefore evolutionary." Patterson,
Good Faith Performance, supra note 89, at 352 n.56. Maybe so, but the prescriptive elements seem
to be just the type of theorizing that Wittgenstein rejected.
174. PG, supra note 26, at 115 ("[T]he task of philosophy is not to create a new, ideal language,
but to clarify the use of our language, the existing language. Its aim is to remove particular misun-
derstandings; not to produce a real understanding for the first time."). Put another way, Wittgenstein
was concerned with what constituted meaning generally, not with what a particular utterance of in-
dividual words meant. Cf. Z, supra note 48, at § 467.
175. PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 88, at 99 n.80.
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Patterson tries to accomplish too many of the goals with his conclusions.
His explanatory powers are most convincing when he is explaining the bene-
fits of incorporating a resort to a practice or telling us why Summers' ex-
cluder analysis is unhelpful. 76 But Patterson tries to do more. His goal is to
shape the law, to point out that good faith should be expansively used and
that so-called narrow interpretations are not correct. 1
77
Patterson's building blocks are arguments based upon usage of language
generally. These arguments are formed in what I would call a prospective
sense: What can language do? What are the possible permutations of trade
usage, course of performance, etc.? But with every contract, the language of
the agreement has been set, the possible permutations have collapsed into
the actual actions of the parties. 178 Patterson uses hermeneutics to discern
parties' intentions and the meaning of their words. In short, he begins by
equating meaning with use (generally), but concludes by equating meaning
with intent and reasonable expectations. 7 9 While this conclusion may be
sustainable by resort to the works of Gadamer, Habermas and others, it is
untrue to its Wittgensteinian foundations.
His conclusion also mixes methods. To show that his view of good faith
can be derived legitimately is not the same thing as showing that it is the
only view that makes sense, or that it is the view that should prevail. 180 Only
if we believe that his method of interpreting "good faith" has a claim on our
exclusive fealty should we go that far. It is not clear to me that hermeneutics
provides the type of answer that would command our sole attention.
Another way to look at the issue is as follows: Do we have a philosophi-
cal problem when we look at the meanings and usages of good faith? I do
not think so--our thinking is not muddled over what we mean so much as it
is muddled over the selection of one of several well-defined choices. Before
176. Id. at 99. His insight that the meaning of good faith is sufficiently diverse to invoke Wittgen-
stein's notions of family resemblances is also good, but I do not think he pursues it far enough. Id.
177. In short, Patterson tries to do philosophy in the guise of law. I do not condemn this enter-
prise-this essay is in large part doing exactly that-but I think one ought to realize its limitations.
Philosophy, at least as seen by Wittgenstein and his successors, may not have much to offer law. As
Richard Rorty has put it, in describing the decline of the "analytic philosopher":
Perhaps the most appropriate model for the analytic philosopher is now the lawyer, rather
than either the scholar or the scientist. The ability to construct a good brief, or conduct a
devastating cross-examination, or find relevant precedents, is pretty much the ability
which analytic philosophers think of as "distinctively philosophical." It is sufficient to be
a good lawyer or to be a good analytic philosopher that you be able to see at a glance the
inferential relationships between all the members of a bewilderingly large set of proposi-
tions.
Richard Rorty, Philosophy in America Today, reprinted in RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF
PRAGMATISM (ESSAYS: 1972-1980) 211, 221 (1982).
178. Cf. Z, supra note 48, at § 231.
179. See generally PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY, supra note 88.
180. See Bayles, supra note 74, at 35-36.
2001, the Code stated simply that good faith is honesty in fact; after 2001, it
added adherence to reasonable standards of fair dealing, following in part
Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. With the choices thus
set, philosophy-at least as conceived of by Wittgenstein-provides no fur-
ther help. 81  The choice in any particular case will ultimately be influenced
by the types of standards lawyers are trained to use-policy considerations,
doctrinal inferences and the like. As for philosophy, it "may in no way in-
terfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it....
It leaves everything as it is."'82
IV. IGNORING WITrGENSTEIN: JUDGES, THE PRACTICE OF LAW AND
WITTGENSTEIN
Regardless of the accuracy of these misgivings, there remains the unan-
swered question I posed in the introduction: Has the resulting clash or inter-
play of views and practices caused participants to modify willingly or oth-
erwise alter their points of view, or has it made more efficient the process by
which their viewpoints were reached? One way to answer this question is by
looking at the audience Patterson seems to have had in mind: courts. Have
courts considered Wittgenstein's philosophy when deciding cases? 83
While academic literature abounds with citations to Wittgenstein, 184 case
citations are fairly rare - only forty state and federal cases even mention
Wittgenstein185 - and the direct effect of philosophers' writings has been
close to nil. 186
181. See Rorty, supra note 177.
182. PI, supra note 19, at § 124.
183. Indeed, courts have not elected to follow Patterson's reading of "good faith," even after cit-
ing his works. See, e.g., U.S. Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Boge, 814 P.2d 1082, 1086 (Or. 1991); Wat-
seka First Nat'l Bank v. Ruda, 552 N.E.2d 775, 778-79 (Ill. 1990). Cf. Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302
F.3d 448, 456 n.20 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Patterson for his tracing of the origins of good faith).
184. Searches in Westlaw's TP-ALL library, using the search "ludwig or 1! w/2 wittgenstein" re-
turns 729 results. The same search in the Lexis US Law Reviews and Journals library returns 652.
Both searches were conducted on September 1, 2004. For a listing of some of these articles, see su-
pra notes 229-58.
185. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); Wansing v. Hargett, 341 F.3d 1207 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 960 (2003); United States v. Siddiqi, 959 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1991); Cont'l Can Co., Inc. v. Chicago
Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154 (7th
Cir. 1990); Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1988); Application of Dow Jones & Co., Inc.,
842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Here-
dia-Fernandez, 756 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241 (5th Cir.
1982); Ass'n of Am. Publishers, Inc. v. Governors of United States Postal Service, 485 F.2d 768
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1968); PSI Energy, Inc. v. United
States, 59 Fed. Cl. 590 (Fed. Cl. 2004); Padilla v. Rumsfield, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003),
remanded by Padilla v. Rumsfield, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd and remanded by Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Bostic v. AT&T of Virgin Islands, 166 F. Supp. 2d 350 (D.V.I.
2001); Weigand v. Village of Tinley Park, 114 F. Supp. 2d 734 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Wynn ex. reL Ala-
bama v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (N.D. Ala. 1999); Hosiery Corp. of Am., Inc. v.
Int'l Data Processing, Inc., 1991 WL 30015 (D.N.J., Feb. 28, 1991); Spicer v. Chicago Bd. Options
Exch., Inc., 1990 WL 172712 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 30, 1990); United States v. Huss, 726 F. Supp. 1140
(N.D. Ill. 1989); Kendall McGaw Laboratories, Inc. v. Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 125 F.R.D. 420 (D.N.J.
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Of these forty available opinions, former academics authored at least
seven, 187 and two California judges account for seven more.' 88 As a conse-
quence, it appears that Wittgenstein's philosophy has not had much direct
impact on individual cases.
1989); Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Ca. 1982); Harris v. Tomczak, 94 F.R.D.
687 (E.D. Ca. 1982); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Marshall, 441 F.Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1977); In re
Bruzzese, 214 B.R. 444 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997); State v. Veilleux, 859 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. Ct. App.
2003); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Noble Broad., 936 S.W.2d 810 (Mo. 1997) (Robertson, J., dissenting); Gatto
v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1997 WL 566048 (Conn. Super Ct. Sept. 3, 1997); People v. Fabris, 37
Cal. Rptr. 2d 667 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Lerner v. Ward, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993);
Taggart v. State, 822 P.2d 243 (Wash. 1992); State v. Lord, 822 P.2d 177 (Wash. 1991); Jackson v.
Rogers & Wells, 258 Cal. Rptr. 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Perry v. Robertson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 74
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Nat'l Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Contreras, 238 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987); People v. Rogers, 217 Cal. Rptr. 809 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Young Life Campaign v.
Patino, 176 Cal. Rptr. 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Fleming, 279
N.E.2d 342 (Mass. 1972).
Two additional cases that cite Wittgenstein are California opinions which were either de-
published or vacated by action of a higher court, and no longer have any official force. See People v.
Aston, 154 Cal. App. 3d 818, withdrawn on reh'g, 208 Cal. Rptr. 754 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); People
v. Cooke, 182 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), ordered depublished on reversal of companion
case.
186. As to the issue of whether there is a constitutional right to die, the United States Supreme
Court rejected the arguments of six prominent philosophers - Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel,
Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thomson. See Vacco v. Quill, 521
U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). See also Rao, supra note 5.
187. Wansing v. Hargett, 341 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 960 (2003)
(McConnell, J.); Contl Can Co., Inc. v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Un-
ion (Indep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.); Stevens v. Tillman, 855
F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.); In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easter-
brook, J.); United States v. Heredia-Fernandez, 756 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1985) (Nelson, J.); Weigand
v. Village of Tinley Park, 114 F. Supp. 2d 734 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (Bucklo, J.); Boston Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. Fleming, 279 N.E.2d 342 (Mass. 1972) (Braucher, J., dissenting).
188. Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Ca. 1982) (Karlton, J.); Harris v.
Tomczak, 94 F.R.D. 687 (E.D. Ca. 1982) (Karlton, J.); People v. Fabris, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 667 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995) (Blease, Acting P.J.); Perry v. Robertson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(Blease, J.); Natl Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Contreras, 238 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
(Blease, J.); People v. Rogers, 217 Cal. Rptr. 809 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (Blease, J.); Young Life
Campaign v. Patino, 176 Cal. Rptr. 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (Blease, J.).
The portion of Justice Blease's opinion in Perry v. Robertson, which quotes Wittgenstein, has
been adopted almost verbatim by two other California Courts of Appeal. See, e.g., Lerner v. Ward,
16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Jackson v. Rogers & Wells, 258 Cal. Rptr. 454 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989). In addition, the two withdrawn opinions cited above in note are also Justice Blease's.
In a world of coincidences, Justice Blease and Judge Karlton were once law partners. Tele-
phone Interview with Douglas Mirell, former extem to Justice Blease (July 23, 1993).
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What use has been made, however, is I think interesting.189 Courts'
use-and misuse-of Wittgenstein's philosophy illustrates the best and
worst of the intersection of philosophy and the law. The worst is hostile
misunderstanding, the overt twisting of words or reputation to a tendentious
aim. This type of hostility was present in Kendall McGaw Laboratories,
Inc. v. Community Memorial Hospital.'9" There, a party sought partial
summary judgment as to damages in a contract dispute.19' Liability, how-
ever, had not been established. 192 In refusing summary judgment, the court
characterized the movant's strategy as: "conceptually-backward nonsense;
damages do not bring forth liability any more than an injury produces a duty.
In this regard the court, like the law, will follow Aristotle rather than
Wittgenstein.'
193
In reality, of course, the court was following neither. The court's refer-
ence seems to be to the notion that Wittgenstein's later philosophy displaces
traditional logic as represented by Aristotle, and admits of no accepted way
of establishing priority of argument. Wittgenstein, however, would probably
view the issue as one of grammar, and would say that use of liability and of
injury in the language game of law is prior to the use of damages and duty,
and that to talk otherwise is to not understand the grammar of the terms.1 94
Just as association with Wittgenstein is used as scorn, some courts take
the opposite turn and dismiss arguments made because they conflict with
views supposedly maintained by Wittgenstein. In both Bunnell v. Sullivan
t95
and United States v. Heredia-Fernandez,196 judges made reference to the
Philosophical Investigations' discussion of the subjectivity of pain. The use
of the reference in each case is different. In Bunnell, Judge Kozinski mocks
Congress' use of "excess pain" in a statute.1 97 In a one line dismissal of this
189. After, of course, exclusion of citations which cite to Wittgenstein for the simplistic and incor-
rect assertion that language is vague or maddeningly imprecise. See, e.g., State v. Veilleux, 859 So.
2d 1224, 1230 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003) ("If subjected to the rigors of linguistic analysis by philosophers,
virtually any sentence contains ambiguity. See generally Ludwig Wittgenstein, PRELIMINARY
STUDIES FOR PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION, generally known as THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS
(N.Y. Harper Press 1958).") (Altenbemd, C.I., dissenting). See also Bostic v. AT&T of Virgin Is-
lands, 166 F. Supp. 2d 350, 357 (D.V.I. 2001) ("While the human mind is most supple at discerning
patterns, the process by which we do so often eludes easy description." See LUDWIG
WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 152-59, 193-229 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed.
1958) (describing the difficulty of capturing mental processes in ordinary language).
190. 125 F.R.D. 420 (D.N.J. 1989).
191. Id. at421.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 422. This language was quoted without attribution by a different district judge in the
same district in Hosiery Corp. v. Int'l Data Processing, Inc., 1991 WL 30015 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 1991).
See also Gatto v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1997 WL 566048 (Conn. Super Ct. Sept. 3, 1997) (dis-
missing a challenge to signage size limitations on content-based grounds by categorizing the simple
advertisements at issue as "not propositions from Wittgenstein").
194. Cf PG, supra note 26, at 60-63. This point was not sufficiently appreciated by Judge
McConnell in Wansing v. Hargett, 341 F.3d 1207, 1214 (10th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
960 (2003), when he referred to Wittgenstein's "game" example as an example of the fact that some
words or terms have meaning but deny definition.
195. 947 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1991).
196. 756 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1985).
197. Bunnell, 947 F.2d 341 at 343 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
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concept, he cites Wittgenstein for the proposition that "[plain, however, like
beauty, is entirely subjective; it is impossible to compare one person's suf-
fering with that of another, much less determine the 'correct' amount of pain
someone should feel because of a particular impairment.', 98 By contrast, in
Heredia-Fernandez Judge Nelson was faced with what she described as a
"philosophical" argument: that a federal agent could not testify that a crimi-
nal defendant had read Miranda warnings given to him on a card and which
were printed in Spanish.' 99 Given the seemingly philosophical nature of the
claim, she responded in kind:
By the same token, however, it would likewise be impossible to at-
test that someone was in fear or pain, or that a person understood
what he was saying; yet the abstract plausibility of such epistemo-
logical skepticism does not justify actual doubts in either everyday
life or the law which governs it. See L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations H 303, 246-50, 84 (3d ed.). 200
In both of these usages, the judges cited Wittgenstein for the proposition
that private sensations cannot be doubted.20' But thereafter the judges de-
part. Judge Kozinski seems to think that pain in others cannot be quantified,
while Judge Nelson indicates that the ability to sense pain in others is a
given in our discourse, and that to doubt it would rise to the level of non-
sense since it is foundational belief.
Judge Nelson gets the better of the citations. She understands that Witt-
genstein's use of the pain examples was to show that there are some things
that we cannot seriously doubt and still function normally..2°2 In contrast,
nothing in Wittgenstein labels pain as essentially subjective.2 °3 Indeed,
given the notion that pain, language and our sensations are all part of a form
of life, we can agree in our judgments about pain and its various manifesta-
tions. In short, the fact that we can talk sensibly about various levels of pain
presupposes that we can compare pain across individuals.2 °4
198. Id. at 351 (Kozinski, J., concurring). Judge Kozinski, apparently not willing to exercise the
courage of his philosophy, forged on and gave the question an answer based upon the congressional
mandate to determine "excess pain." See id.
199. Heredia, 756 F.2d at 1416.
200. Id.
201. See id.; see also Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 351.
202. Wittgenstein elaborates on this concept in On Certainty. OC, supra note 43, at § 115 ("If
you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting
itself presupposes certainty."); id. at § 604 ("In a court of law the statement of a physicist that water
boils at about 100" C. would be accepted unconditionally as truth. [1] If I mistrusted this statement
what could I do to undermine it? Set up experiments myself? What would they prove?").
203. Z, supra note 48, at § 555 ("The uncertainty [of whether someone else feels pain] relates not
to the particular case, but to the method, to the rules of evidence."); see also id. at §§ 532-64.
204. See id. at §§ 531-36.
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In one sense, these decisions focus on the periphery. Wittgenstein is
more closely associated with his writings on the nature of meaning than with
his writings on private sensation. Courts' usages of his philosophy of mean-
ing are more varied. In three opinions, for example, Judge Easterbrook has
touched briefly on Wittgenstein and the nature of statutory interpretation.2 °5
In In re Erickson,0 6 Judge Easterbrook was faced with construing the term
"mower" in a Wisconsin exemption statute. In surveying the ways in which
a term can be employed, Judge Easterbrook cites Saul Kripke's controversial
discussion of Wittgenstein for the proposition that: "Which feature [of a pos-
sible interpretation] is important depends on the function of the designation
and how it will be interpreted by the audience to whom the word is ad-
dressed. 20 7 That Judge Easterbrook is referring directly to Wittgenstein is
confirmed by his subsequent use of Erickson in Continental Can Co., Inc. v.
Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union (Independ-
ent) Pension Fund.a°8 In that case, Judge Easterbrook cited to the passage
quoted above from Erickson in a case involving the use of subsequent legis-
lative history in federal statutory interpretation, noting that: "Words do not
have meanings given by natural law. You don't have to be Ludwig Wittgen-
stein or Hans-Georg Gadamer to know that successful communication de-
pends on meanings shared by interpretive communities. 2 °9 From this asser-
tion, he argues that since later statements about intent by definition could not
be shared by those involved in the passage of the legislation, they are useless
in interpreting the statute.210 Judge Easterbrook's third use again cites
Kripke's work,21' but for a different proposition: that the difference between
fact and opinion in one of convention, not one based upon transcendental
differences between the two.
212
Judge Easterbrook's use of Wittgenstein, although in areas closer to the
core of his later philosophy, is suspect. The brevity with which Judge
Easterbrook deals with Wittgenstein itself shows that the citations are not
serious, in the sense of being necessary or sufficient to establish the assertion
205. Cont'l Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pen-
sion Fund, 916 F.2d 1154 (7th Cir. 1990); Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1988); In re
Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1987). A more recent example of a court's use of Wittgenstein
with respect to statutory interpretation is PSI Energy, Inc. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 590, 601 n.20
(2004) (referring to "custom, usage, convention, and especially in its context, that language estab-
lishes a common and shared meaning" for statutes, and then stating that Wittgenstein "recognized
that the meaning of a word is its use in the language." L. WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS, 20e (G. Anscombe trans. 1953)).
206. Erickson, 815 F.2d at 1092.
207. Id. Judge Easterbrook's supporting citation is SAUL KRIPKE, WrrTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND
PRIVATE LANGUAGE 19, 28, 98-109 (1982). Erickson, 815 F.2d at 1092.
208. Cont'l Can Co., 916F.2d at 1154.
209. Id. at 1157. Other judges have invoked similar references regarding the importance of con-
text. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 576 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Gulf Ins. Co. v.
Noble Broadcast, 936 S.W.2d 810, 818 (Mo. S.Ct. 1997) (Robertson, J., dissenting).
210. Cont'l Can Co., 916 F.2d at 1157. As stated by Judge Easterbrook, "That is why statements
after enactment do not count; the legislative history of a bill is valuable only to the extent it shows
genesis and evolution, making 'subsequent legislative history' an oxymoron." id.
211. Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1988).
212. See id.
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being made. They are the judicial equivalent of using a "big" name to cover
an otherwise unexceptional argument.213 Moreover, on the issue of legisla-
tive intent, Wittgenstein was quite willing to say that a law could have an
intent even if no legislator held that intent at the time of consideration and
passage. As he stated, "Might it not even be imagined that several people
had carried out an intention without any one of them having it? In this way
a government may have an intention that no man has. 214 Wittgenstein's ob-
servation is on the grammar of how he understood the use of a term. Judge
Easterbrook, I take it, would disagree. In any event, Easterbrook's citations
of Wittgenstein are odd, and likely wrong.
The use of Wittgenstein by California's Justice Blease is more varied,
and more interesting. In National Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Contreras,
215
the issue was whether a pickup truck was a private passenger automobile
within the coverage of a particular policy of insurance.216 Justice Blease an-
swered the question in the negative after examining the way in which the in-
surance policy defined its terms.217 Along the way, Justice Blease had occa-
sion to cite to Wittgenstein in a lengthy footnote, during which he said the
following:
What is a simple matter of linguistic practice may not be easily ex-
plained.... Perhaps, '[o]ur disease is one of wanting to explain.'
(Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (rev.
ed. 1978) p.33 3.) One cure for the disease lies in the recognition
that we sometimes define a term, not by an essential property
(common to all of its applications) which captures its essence, but
ostensively (by showing samples of the term), because that is how
we learned its meaning. A sample embodies a concept, and hence a
definition of that sampled, because we use it (symbolically) as a
model or exemplar of the concept and not the thing itself. This
could be viewed analogously as a common law of language us-
age.... We ordinarily learn the concepts of cars and trucks in this
manner. A difficulty may arise when a hybrid or unusual case is
presented which does not conform to the samples by which we ac-
quired our conceptual knowledge. 'It is only in normal cases that
213. See Schauer, supra note 10 (criticizing the use of phrases like "post-Wittgensteinian" as "at-
tempting to lean on the argumentative props of associations with philosophers whose names are cur-
rently fashionable in legal circles"). See also supra note 237.
214. Z, supra note 48, at § 48 (emphasis in original). This view is reaffirmed by Wittgenstein's
rhetorical question asking if a statement of the form "This law was not given with such cases in
view." is senseless. See id. at § 120.
215. 238 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
216. id. at 628.
217. Id. at 642.
the use of a word is clearly prescribed; [ ] the more abnormal the
case, the more doubtful it becomes what we are to say.' (Wittgen-
stein, Philosophical Investigations (3d ed. 1958) § 142.)218
Before Justice Blease was a situation not unambiguously covered by ordi-
nary usage. Sometimes a pickup truck is a private passenger automobile,
sometimes not. He thus turns to the definitions contained within the policy
of insurance to resolve the dispute, bringing more to the analysis than just
testimony of particular past ostensive definitions. And in this regard, Justice
Blease continues:
The fact that we define some words in... [an ostensive] manner
does not necessarily rule out definitional explanations of a descrip-
tive type. The danger is that some singular property might be seized
upon as the essential characteristic of the word. The semantic anti-
dote requires a more elaborate descriptive apparatus than is gener-
ally recognized, one which is aimed at revealing the multiplicity of
(sometimes disparate) circumstances to which a word may be ap-
plied. What is likely to be discovered by this kind of explanatory
effort is the subtlety of our language practices, by which the play of
the language is revealed (shown) only within the particular circum-
stances in which it is used.219
Justice Blease thus employs a method sympathetic to Wittgenstein's own
examinations. He describes the usages and the context in which those us-
ages occur. Since the primary context was the policy itself, it was appropri-
ate to turn to it for assistance in determining whether to exclude the pickup
truck.
But Justice Blease's most famous use of Wittgenstein may be his most
flawed. In Perry v. Robertson, a seller of a house sued his real estate agent
for failing to reduce a profitable oral offer to an enforceable writing. 220
Among the damages requested were attorneys' fees, recoverable under Cali-
fornia law only if the seller sought to recover under the listing contract, and
not under tort law.22' In affirming a finding that such fees could be recov-
ered, Justice Blease noted the following in a footnote:
In this context, whether the tort-contract action is the one or the
other is purely one of legal perspective. This is analogous to the
example of the line drawing which could be seen either as a duck or
as a rabbit, a duck-rabbit, at the will of the viewer. (Wittgenstein,
218. Id. at 631 n.7. Justice Blease has analogized this type of linguistic analysis with common
law reasoning before. People v. Rogers, 217 Cal. Rptr. 809, 815 n.12 (1985).
219. Contreras, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 631 n.7.
220. 247 Cal. Rptr. 74, 75 (1988).
221. Id.
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Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell ed. 1953) Part II, p.
194e.) 222
The footnote contains the sketch from the book.
I think this use of Wittgenstein misses the point. As noted above,223 in
the Philosophical Investigations one of Wittgenstein's concerns was ridding
philosophy of the notion that meaning was "in the mind" or the product of
internal mental processes and thus private to the speaker or to the listener.
In the passage quoted by Justice Blease, Wittgenstein was using optical illu-
sions to illustrate this point.224 Whether we "see" a duck or a rabbit is not
reducible to psychological or biological explanations. It is also not arbitrary.
Rather, it is a function of the state of our language acquisition and mastery -
a function of what are called rabbits, and what are called ducks.225
In another sense, however, Justice Blease may be correct. Whether sev-
eral actions taken together breach a contract or breach a tort duty (or both) is
a question decided within the legal system according to the language games
employed by lawyers and judges. One trained in the practice of law is able
to make that distinction, among others, and resolve the dispute. So the char-
acterization of a legal action is "purely one of legal perspective," albeit
along different lines than those apparently suggested by Justice Blease. It
will be the uses common in the language game of the law that will decide the
ultimate application.
V. USING WrrrGENSTEIN TO INFORM LAW: THOMAS MORAWETZ'S
UNDERSTANDING DISAGREEMENT
This discussion leads to the following question: Is there any role for the
use of Wittgenstein's philosophy in law or jurisprudence? I believe that the
obvious answer is yes, and an examination of Professor Thomas Morawetz's
article, Understanding Disagreement, The Root Issue of Jurisprudence: Ap-
plying Wittgenstein to Positivism, Critical Theory, and Judging,226 illustrates
how.227
222. Id. at 75 n.1.
223. See supra, Part II(A).
224. Cf. PI, supra note 19, at 197 ("'Seeing as .. ' is not part of perception. And for that reason
it is like seeing and again not like.").
225. Id. at 208. ("'Now he's seeing it like this', 'now like that' would only be said of someone
capable of making certain applications of the figure quite freely. (I ] The substratum of this experi-
ence is the mastery of a technique.").
226. 141 U. PA. L. REv. 371 (1992).
227. Professor Morawetz has published a revised and shortened version of this essay in his recent
book, THOMAS MORAWETZ, LAW'S PREMISES AND LAW'S PROMISE: JURISPRUDENCE AFrER
WrITGENSTEIN (COLLECTED ESSAYS IN LAW) (2000).
Rather than focusing on the particulars of individual cases, Professor
Morawetz uses Wittgenstein's writings in a much different manner.228 The
difference can be captured by looking at the goals of Morawetz's article.
Unlike Patterson, who attempted to characterize certain judicial decisions as
correct or incorrect, Morawetz is more concerned with characterizations of
how judges reach their decisions.
A. Disagreement and the Practice of Law
In particular, Morawetz asserts that "[tihe metaphors and assumptions of
legal theorists have characteristically oversimplified judicial agreement and
disagreement., 229 Judges, according to Morawetz, participate in a shared de-
liberative practice, to which each judge contributes his or her own back-
ground, insights and justifications, and in which each judge is bound by
common and shared notions of relevancy and procedure. 230 This view of
judges and judicial practice deflects many "destabilizing" arguments regard-
ing law: that law is not neutral in any real sense, and is just power politics;
that law is conceptually monochromatic, excluding all but mainstream
voices; and that law, being bound up in language, ultimately incorporates the
rootless search for meaning.23'
Morawetz's method patiently examines the nature of judicial decision-
making. Flaws in jurisprudence, Morawetz asserts, arise because theories or
theorists "ignore that the individual judge is more than a locus of idiosyn-
cratic value or idiosyncratic techniques of understanding, representative only
of himself or his group. 2 32 Morawetz correctly asserts that reality is more
complex, and that such implication occurs only at the cost of accuracy of de-
scription. 3 Judges simultaneously understand that they have their own way
of understanding experience and that their way is not unique, universal or
privileged. Aware that they are obliged to justify their decisions, judges use
their own "idiosyncratic character of [their own] individual strategies of jus-
tification" 234 to fit their reasoning into a common pattern of justification. In
doing so, they both reaffirm their individual way of looking at the world and
the collective need for common agreement on the practice of judicial deci-
sion-making.235
228. Professor Morawetz is no stranger to integrating Wittgenstein and legal concepts See
THOMAS MORAWETZ, WI-rGENSTEIN AND KNOWLEDGE: THE IMPORTANCE OF ON CERTAINTY
(1978) [hereinafter MORAWETZ, IMPORTANCE OF CERTAINTY]; Thomas Morawetz, Law as Experi-
ence: Theory and the Internal Aspect of Law, 52 SMU L. REv. 27 (1999) [hereinafter, Morawetz,
Law as Experience]; Thomas Morawetz, The Epistemology of Judging: Wittgenstein and Delibera-
tive Practices, 3 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 35 (1990).
229. MORAwETz, supra note 227, at 454; P0, supra note 46, at 165.
230. MORAWETZ, supra note 227, at 455. Cf Z, supra note 48, at § 350.
231. MORAWETZ, supra note 227, at 375-76.
232. Id. at 455.
233. See PI, supra note 19, at § 124; Ackerman, supra note 30, at 205.
234. MORAWETZ, supra note 227, at 411.
235. Morawetz believes that judges will come to consensus on three broad topics. "They will
agree on broad generalities about need and social value. They will agree on formal procedures for
debate and decision. And they will agree in the mutual recognition of relevant arguments." Id. at
840
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Morawetz uses his concept of judicial decision-making as a shared prac-
tice to take on, among others, those who would use Wittgenstein's writings
to establish "skeptical and destabilizing" arguments about the legitimacy of
law.236 In particular, Morawetz uses the concept of a shared practice to de-
bunk the arguments that law is nothing more than disguised power. He takes
on the notions that value pluralism, conceptual relativism and semantic rela-
tivity each deprive any legal system claims to neutral creation and applica-
tion of laws.
Value pluralism asserts that since different people in a polity have dif-
ferent value preferences, the establishment of laws that promise equal treat-
ment is illusory. This failure would appear to be fundamental. Since the
problem lies in the definition of what is "equal treatment," no amount of
good faith effort can achieve the stated goal, since the goal itself is tainted.
Morawetz, following Wittgenstein, does not answer the questions posed
by this position. Instead, he examines the premises underlying the position,
237 to ossso h wrns
and "dissolves" the objection. The dissolution consists of the awareness
that different judges have different perceptions about these values, and that
these values are tied inextricably to the way judges, and citizens, perceive
reality. Accordingly, there is no creation and enforcement of a non-neutral
goal. Rather, there is an ongoing practice and debate over its terms and over
the way to satisfy those terms.238 The issue is thus not one of value plural-
ism, but pluralism or relativity in justificatory patterns or strategies. 239 This,
in turn, is already part of the shared practice of judicial decision-making.
Judges will take into account the value systems of others as part of reaching
their own conclusions. As Morawetz concludes, "[t]he normative lesson,
such as it is, is to maximize empathic consideration of alternative ways of
thinking. 2 4 °
433. One might ask whether this is sufficient, but again that question requires dissolution: sufficient
for what? The basis for agreement is suggested by the continued participation in the endeavor:
"Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man
declares the other a fool and heretic." OC, supra note 43, at § 611.
236. MORAWETZ, supra note 227, at 430.
237. Id. at 432. Cf. PO, supra note 46, at 183 ("The problems are dissolved in the actual sense of
the word-like a lump of sugar in water.").
238. That this view is open to the possibility of a divergence of values sufficient to undermine
political stability is, I think, an empirical rather than an analytical question for Wittgenstein. See,
e.g., LUDWIG WITrrGENSTEIN, REMARKS ON COLOUR Part III § 32 (Linda L. McAlister & Margarete
Schaittle trans., G.E.M. Anscombe ed., 1977) ("Is it possible then for different people in this way to
have different colour concepts? Somewhat different ones. Different with respect to one or another
feature. And that will impair their mutual understanding to a greater or lesser extent, but often
hardly at all.") (emphasis in original).
239. MORAWETZ, supra note 227, at 438. See also Morawetz, Law as Experience, supra note
229, at 49-52.
240. MORAWETZ, supra note 227, at 433.
The argument based on conceptual relativism takes value pluralism one
step further.24' Whereas value pluralism asserts only that people hold irrec-
oncilable values, it does not question the cognitive similarity of the people
holding the different views. Conceptual relativism does. If accurate, law
dissembles into power politics, since the ways in which the majority thinks
will dominate, the ways in which the majority sees the issues will define the
debate. Those who think differently are heard, but in a muted and handi-
capped manner. If taken to its logical conclusion (with sufficient differ-
ences) it calls into question our ability to communicate.
Morawetz again dissolves rather than answers these questions. As he
states it, "[t]he fact that these questions seem intractable is a clue to the fact
that, however much they betray important issues, they too are pseudo-
questions, questions to be dissolved rather than answered. '' 242 The key here
is recognizing that judges are not bound by one discrete conceptual scheme,
and cannot see or understand others. In fact, we acknowledge daily that oth-
ers may view key aspects of legal life differently. This difference can be
carried too far. We do not differ on key aspects--otherwise communication
as simple as ordering a meal in a restaurant would be impossible, rather than
just difficult. 243
Semantic relativity is also prone to dissolution. Morawetz views seman-
tic relativity as incorporating the notion that words do not have determinate
and invariant meanings. 244 From this, some observers "den[y] the possibility
of communication and any kind of shared belief altogether., 245 Morawetz,
,246however, labels this approach "counterintuitive," and adopts a milder form
that emphasizes that context, whether historical or polemical, "conditions the
reader's grasp of the text., 247 This, in turn, entails "'that the reader is not
completely free to decide the meaning of the text.248 The text is already
determinate enough, for instance, to narrow the range of possible
contexts.' 249 And Morawetz's view of judicial decision-making as a delib-
erative practice incorporates this view by placing different individuals, each
conditioned by their own history, in a common enterprise, the product of
241. This issue has a different resolution depending upon whether the focus is cultural relativ-
ism-differences in acculturation among people who think in essentially the same ways-or cogni-
tive relativism--differences among individuals based upon different notions of logic, inference and
rationality. If the latter is the case, it is hard to see how Wittgenstein's work has any application,
since it would deny the possibility of the conventions upon which his later work is based on all ex-
cept the crudest of grounds. See GRAYLING, supra note 17, at 104-06; Markell, supra note 89, at
1125.
242. MORAWETZ, supra note 227, at 436.
243. Cf PI, supra note 19, part II, § xi, at 223 ("If a lion could talk, we could not understand
him."); Z, supra note 48, at § 219 ("We don't understand Chinese gestures any more than Chinese
sentences.").
244. MORAWETZ, supra note 227, at 439.
245. Id. at 440.
246. Id.
247. Id. (quoting David C. Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist Per-
spectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 135, 138 (1985)). See also Morawetz, Law as Experience, supra note
228, at 66.
248. See id.
249. Id.
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their own history, in a common enterprise, the product of which reflects both
their diversity and their commitment to the shared practice.25 °
B. Judging, Disagreement and Wittgenstein
Each of these moves can be characterized as within the spirit of Witt-
genstein. Wittgenstein stated that philosophy "leaves everything as it is."25'
As noted by Robert Ackerman:
Wittgenstein's philosophers function as a sanitation corps.... They
speak the local language while they sweep up and dispose of the
trash, leaving the City clean and orderly. Philosophy is not the
teaching of a set of philosophical doctrines but the activity of put-
ting the City in order.252
Wittgenstein was also not particularly receptive to theory in the sense of ex-
planations which simply satisfy our "craving for generality. '253 Morawetz's
method does not "go outside" to explain what is going on "inside.
254
Rather, he describes the shared practice of judicial decision-making, and
notes its complexity. 255 He then uses this description to test the various anti-
foundationalist arguments against law.256 If his description of how judges
work is accurate, he has shown that these theories have glossed over impor-
tant subtleties and features of experience.2 57
Note how this move differs from Patterson. Rather than posit a different
meta-scheme for ordering experience, he offers a description of a practice,
and uses that practice, and the experiences it generates, to assess other de-
scriptions of law. In a way, this is non-normative. Morawetz makes no
claims that his description is durable or transcendent. It is subject to change
as practices change or if his description needs revision. As he concludes:
[D]escribing law as a deliberative practice can be neither conserva-
tive nor radical. The law itself, the deliberative practice that is law,
will be conservative if the society is homogeneous or successfully
repressive, if new voices and ways of thinking remain unrepre-
sented. The law will be radical if society is heterogeneous and new
250. Cf RFM, supra note 22, part IaI, at § 5.
251. PI, supra note 19, at § 124.
252. ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at 204.
253. BBB, supra note 35, at 17.
254. See PG, supra note 26, at 143 ("It is in language that it's all done.") (emphasis in original).
255. Cf PI, supra note 19, at §§ 125-27.
256. Id.
257. See Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Note, Breaking the Rules?: Wittgenstein and Legal Realism,
107 YALE L.J. 1853 (1998).
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ways of justifying and conceiving aims are continually given legal
expression. The law will, furthermore, be liberal in Mill's sense
whenever it is open to new ways of thinking, whenever judges rec-
ognize that their ways of reasoning and justifying, i.e. their stake, do
not necessarily have hegemony.
In this sense, Morawetz engages in "bottom-up" reasoning. He attempts
generalizations only after first surveying experience. This again, is in line
with Wittgenstein. One of the reasons Wittgenstein distrusted theory is that
it tends to smooth over inevitable rough spots in reality, and in so doing pre-
sents a less than accurate picture of life. 5
VI. CONCLUSION
Wittgenstein did not trust conventional praise of Shakespeare:
When, for instance, I hear the expression of admiration for Shake-
speare by distinguished men in the course of several centuries, I can
never rid myself of the suspicion that praising him has been the
conventional thing to do;... an enormous amount of praise [has]
been, and [is] still to be, lavished on Shakespeare without under-
standing and for the wrong reasons by a thousand professors of lit-
erature.26°
In the end, Wittgenstein's writings too must stand or fall on their own merit,
and the worth of his writings need to be dissociated from the fame of his
name.
Independent of the quest to interpret Wittgenstein, carried on largely by
professional philosophers, law continues to affect everyday people every
day. Their lives are governed, or altered, by its rules and precepts. Grap-
pling with how law interacts with people, and how it should interact, is the
legacy and function of law, or at least the "rule of law." From this we return
Gould's observation that "law gives decisive weight to the history of its own
development."26' Maybe that quality is desirable, or maybe it is ingrained in
our system. But to give "decisive" weight to history does not mean that
there is no room for other considerations in the analysis.
The extent of analytic philosophy's role, however, is open to debate.
The contrast is especially sharp when dealing with the work of philosophers
258. MORAWETZ, supra note 227, at 456.
259. Cf. Z, supra note 48, at § 456.
Some philosophers (or whatever you like to call them) suffer from what may be called
"loss of problems." Then everything seems quite simple to them, no deep problems seem
to exist any more, the world becomes broad and flat and loses all depth, and what they
write becomes immeasurably shallow and trivial.
Id.
260. LUDWIG WrrTGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 48 (Peter Winch trans., G.H. von Wright ed.,
1980).
261. Gould, supra note 3, at 118.
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such as Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's philosophy is extremely far-
reaching, attempting as it does to describe the ways in which we connect
with the world and with other minds. His remarks on meaning cover all dis-
course, from grocery orders to Einstein's explanation of relativity.
Against this background, I have argued in this article that the use of
Wittgenstein's remarks to resolve any particular legal dispute-such as the
scope of good faith in the Uniform Commercial Code-is not only untrue to
Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, it is akin to using quantum me-
chanics to brew a pot of coffee. One could do it if you had a fully worked
out theory of the intersection of quantum theory and thermodynamics, which
does not yet exist, but why work that hard? Simpler and perfectly effective
means-a coffee pot and a plug-exist to accomplish the goal. The scarcity
with which the judiciary cites Wittgenstein, despite ample academic use, un-
derscores this point.
In contrast, scholars such as Morawetz help us understand why tools as
imperfect as those used everyday by judges and lawyers work, while at the
same time showing us the limits of those tools. Within these limits, how-
ever, as the common law has long shown, there is plenty of room for debate
and for change. One need not invoke the name of any philosopher, let alone
Wittgenstein, to direct the law. To do so is to be consigned to that space oc-
cupied by "a thousand professors of literature" for whom the invocation of a
name is a premise in an argument, and who perpetuate the kind of philoso-
phical theorizing that causes lawyers', as well as scientists', eyes to glaze
over.
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